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PREFACE

This study attempts to show how Americans in general
remembered the Vietnam War from 1975 to 1985, the decade
after it ended.

The focus of the study is history in the

popular realm, including novels as well as nonfiction,
poetry, plays, movies, television shows, articles in
political journals, history in the political arena, songs,
memorials, public opinion polls and more.
but academic history is examined.

Most everything

As a kind of social

history, the study seeks to determine the nature and
influence of popular historical memory.

CHAPTER 1
THE PUBLIC FORGETS THE WAR

Wanting To Forget The War

When Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese on April 30,
1975, and the Vietnam War finally ended, Americans began
viewing the long, divisive episode through historical
lenses.

Indeed, for the United States the war was history

in 1975, for the Paris accords of 1973 had ended America's
combat role in Indochina and arranged for the return of her
prisoners of war.

Their emotional homecoming was perhaps

the only thing resembling a clear and satisfying conclusion.
Having put the war behind them two years before, Americans
were now in a position to be historical.

In assessing the

war and what went wrong, both political observers and
ordinary citizens spoke with a trace of distance in their
voice, reflecting not just the chronological distance
between the Paris settlement and the fall of Saigon but also
the physical and even spiritual one between war-torn Vietnam
and the peaceful United States.

They spoke with disgust and

embarrassment as well, from the right, the left, the middle
and the undefined.

1

2

On the left, Irving Howe, editor of Dissent magazine,
called the American role in Saigon's last days "squalid,"
bringing to an "ugly culmination a history of confusion,
deceit, stupidity, crime. "I

Howe's strong language was

matched by other critics of the war.

Frances Fitzgerald,

author of Fire In The Lake, the award-winning history of
Vietnam, said, "The rigidity and stupidity of American
policy in Indochina has entirely to do with the fact that no
American president has ever really cared what happened to
Indochina."

Referring to Richard Nixon and his advisers,

Fitzgerald added that the war had dragged on "because a few
cynical men wished to prove themselves right and to retain
their old authority with the American public. ,,1

Stanley

Karnow, a journalist who covered the war and would later
write its best-selling popular history, said he could not
believe that the United States, a nation of moral
principles, had been responsible for "one of the major human
·
trage d ~es

0

f

mo d ern t '~mes. ,,3

Several commentators used the

I Irving Howe,

"Vietnam: The Sorrow and the Pity,"
Dissent (Summer 1975), 213.
2 Frances Fitzgerald, "The End is The Beginning," New
Republic, 3 May 1975, 8.
3 Stanley Karnow, "Grand Illusion," ibid., 8.

3
word "evil" to describe American policies in Vietnam. 4
Other descriptions were "moral and intellectual poverty";
"the arrogance of might" and "the arrogance of
righteousness"; "stupid, tragic"; and policies conducted
"madly. ,,5
For very different reasons the political right also saw
the war as wretched and decadent.

Writing in the National

Review, one of the leading conservative journals, Anthony
Bouscaren quoted an American businessman in Saigon who
called the United States "a simpering, defeatist,
isolationist nation":
The damage done to America by the Vietnam debacle is
inestimable.
It is going to work a spell on America for
25 years. America is going into a national eclipse, and
it is going that way willingly.
It is bad enough for me
personally to leave a place where I had planned to build
a life.
I don't expect anyone to give a damn about
that.
But Americas has lost its honor, and no one cares
about that either.

4 "On The Disaster," ibid., and Jeffrey Race, "The
Unlearned Lessons of Vietnam," Yale Review (December 1976),
162.
5 Hans Morgenthau, "The Elite Protects Itself," New
Republic, 3 May 1975, 21; National Council of Churches,
"Cleanse Us Of Arrogance," Christian Centur~, 7 May
1975, 462; David Halberstam, "Why It Never Worked,"
Newsweek, 14 April 1975, 3; Anthony Lewis, "Hubris,
National and Personal," New Republic, 3 May 1975, 17.

6 Anthony Bouscaren, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front,"
National Review, 20 June 1975, 660.

4

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sounded a similar theme,
describing Congressional action toward South Vietnam in
terms of abandonment and wondering what- that said about
American credibility.?

Navy Commander Richard Stratton, who

spent six years in Vietnam and two months in a North
Vietnamese prison, said:
America's disengagement was inevitable, but the manner
in which we did it was embarrassing.
I certainly
thought we owed it to the Vietnamese to show a little
more class than that. We led them down the primrose
path and left them hanging on the end of the limb. Then
we sawed it off. So why should we be surprised when
we see them fall? As for me, I did everything I could.
I can face myself in the mirror.
I don't know how many
other tmericans like Jane Fonda can say the same
thing.
While public opinion of the war was diverse, most
Americans were anxious to consign the event to history.

A

Gallup poll conducted in March 1975, when the North
Vietnamese began their final, victorious drive, showed that
78 percent of those asked were against further aid to South
Vietnam.

In April, when President Gerald Ford requested

$300 million in emergency aid from Congress and was denied,
75 percent told Gallup they were against Ford's request. 9
Americans regretted the collapse of South Vietnam, but

Department of State Bulletin, 28 April 1975, 548.
8 Time, "Opinions of U.S. Warmakers, 12 May 1795, 23.

9 Martin Arnold, "Hawks and Doves Glad It's Ending," New
York Times, 20 April 1975, section I, p. 3.

5

Congressmen heard little support in their districts for
trying to save a lost cause.

Don Bonker, a Democrat from

Washington, said, "People are drained.
the memory of Indochina."lO

They want to bury

Republican Garner Shriver of

Kansas spoke for many when he said, "The feeling is that
we've made a considerable contribution to Cambodia and South
Vietnam and that we've done enough. ,,11
The most succinct expression may have come from Abner
Mikva, a Democratic

Cong~cssman

from suburban Chicago, who

noted Americans "want to pull the oceans over their
heads."l'

They wanted, in other words, to forget there was

such a place as Vietnam.

They wanted to forget that

Americans had fought there for eight years, that some 58,000
had died, that 270,000 had been wounded, that the United
States had spent so much blood and bile in fighting and
arguing the war.

Said a badly wounded Marine, "For the

American public this will be forgotten.

Just like a bad

dream ... 13
Heeding public sentiment, President Ford gave a speech
at Tulane University on April 23, 1975, in which he declared

10 Time, 14 April 1975, 22.
1l Ibid.
12 Newsweek, 28 April 1975, 12.
13 Ibid.
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the Vietnam War to be over for the United States.

His

declaration drew enthusiastic applause from the audience.
Ford called for "a great national reconciliation," saying,
"Today America can regain the sense of pride that existed
before Vietnam.

But it cannot be achieved by refighting a

war that is finished--as far as America is concerned."l(

At

a news conference several weeks later, Ford repeated
himself, saying, "The war is over.
many respects.

It was sad and tragic in

I think it would be unfortunate for us to

rehash allegations as to individuals who might be to blame,
or Administrations that might be at fault.
that it's over, we ought to look ahead.

It seems to me
" 15

Ford thus set the tone for the postwar debate.

The war

itself, its political history and detail, would in fact be
debated hardly at all.

America would instead brush herself

off, stride toward her bicentennial in 1976 and try to learn
what she could from the Vietnam experience.
learning take place without debate?

How could

The unspoken idea was

to view the episode pragmatically, keeping it in the back of
the mind, not dwelling on it and continuing to succumb to
its poisons.

In the much-remarked national manner,

Americans would look to the future, not the past.

There

14 New York Times, 24 April 1975, section I, p. 19.
15 Ibid., 7 May 1975, section I, p. 20.

7

would be healing and a minimum of recriminations.

This was

implied in Ford's "great national reconciliation."
Appropriately, his memoirs were entitled A Time To Heal,
referring to both the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal
which made him president.
As 1975 came to a close, so did the war in the American
memory, for a time, anyway.

Once the flood of postmortems

had been issued by politicians, statesmen, newspaper
columnists and various pundits, one saw or heard very little
about the war.

President Ford barely mentioned it in his

1976 State of the Union address,16 and it was not a topic of
discussion in the presidential campaign of that year.
Columnist Joseph Kraft noted how the war was conspicous by
its absence from the campaign, saying Ford and his eventual
Democratic opponent, Jimmy Carter, were practicing "the
politics of reassurance."

By running as an outsider to

Washington, Carter, said Kraft, implied the war was yet
another mess stirred up in the capital, not a national
creation.

For his part, Ford was fond of quoting Dwight

16 Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of
Representatives, The Presidential Campaign of 1976
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978),
179.

8

Eisenhower: "America is great because America is good." 11
Neither party's platform mentioned the war, except for brief
references to assisting Vietnam veterans. 18
The war resurfaced in January 1977 when President Jimmy
Carter's first executive action was to pardon those who
evaded the Vietnam draft, making good on a campaign promise.
In an interview the year before, Carter had spoken
thoughtfully of those who had served in the war and those
who had managed to avoid it.

Said Carter:

In the area of the country where I live, defecting
from military service is almost unheard of. Most of the
young people in my section of Georgia are quite poor.
They didn't know how to get to Canada, they didn't have
enough money to hide in college. They thought this war
was wrong. They preferred to stay home, but still they
went to Vietnam . • • • It's very difficult for me to
equate what they did to what the young people did who
left the country. So for a long time it was hard for me
to address the question in objective fashion, but I
think it's time to get the Vietnam War over with • • . •
I don't have the desire to punish anyone.
I'd just like
to tell the young folks who did defect to come home,
with no requirement that you be punished or that you
serve in some humanitarian capacity or ~nything.
Just
come back home, the whole thing's over.
Carter's pardon angered some, but like the war it was soon
forgotten.

Like his predecessor, Carter spoke of healing,

11 Joseph Kraft, "Campaign Cop-Out," Washington Post, 4
April 1976, section III, p. 7.
18 Donald B. Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms, vol.
1 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 928:979.

19 Washington Post, 22 January 1977, section I, p. 1.
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of putting the bad memories to rest.
Through the late 1970s and into the eighties, certain
aspects of the Vietnam War briefly held the public's
attention.

In his book The Unfinished War, Walter Capps

showed how on most any given day a war-related topic could
be found in the mass media.

For example, on September 16,

1981, the Los Angeles Times carried a story about a new
television film called Fly Away Angel, which its producer
described as "an objective look at the war as if it had been
fought one thousand years ago, as if I was writing a drama
about the Trojan War."

In the Times on the same day was

news of a Vietnam veteran's suicide.

On the day before his

funeral there was news of a demonstration outside the
Veterans Administration hospital which had treated the
victim, whom, the demonstrators felt, had died because "the
VA was unresponsive and irresponsible."

The same week,

People magazine ran a story about David Christian, who at 18
had become the Army's youngest second lieutenant to graduate
from Officer's Candidate School and who, upon being disabled
by napalm burns in Vietnam, became the Army's youngest
retired captain at 21.

Christian then launched a drive for

Vietnam veterans' rights. 20

20 Walter Capps, The Unfinished War (Boston: Beacon Hill
Press, 1982), 2-4.
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David Christian's story and most others about the war
were notable for their human interest, but also for their
lack of political history.

Hollywood and to a lesser extent

the publishing industry produced Vietnam stories that were
usually personal, fictitious or both, and the number of
these were at first a trickle, for years would pass before
the war became an acceptable subject.

Upon receiving the

first draft of an American veteran's tale, one literary
agent remembered thinking, "Vietnam--oh, God, I don't need
this.

How do I go about turning it down?"ZI

If personal

versions were a trickle, objective histories, even popular
works, were a mere drip.

Americans, it seemed, liked a good

story and Vietnam stories were no exception, but few were
interested in the war itself.

They were drawn to the

personal struggles of a David Christian, but not to the
politics of his war.

From 1975 to 1985 only two general

histories made their mark: Vietnam: A History, by Stanley
Karnow, a long, journalistic account which accompanied a
Public Broadcasting series on the war; and America's Longest
War, by historian George Herring, a concise, academic
account which became the standard college text.

There were,

of course, many other works, but most were specialized and

21 David Gelman,
February 1978, 86.

"Vietnam Marches Home,"

Newsweek,

13
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did not reach a wide audience.

Karnow's and Herring's works

did reach many, Karnow's selling 350,000 copies by 1985, but
neither was a publishing phenomenon. 22

They hardly filled

the void of Vietnam War history.
Proof of the void's existence was to be found in public
opinion surveys, classrooms and even the White House.

A

poll by the New York Times, commmissioned for the tenth
anniversary of the war's end in 1985, showed that two out of
five Americans could not identify South Vietnam as our
ally.23

James Matray, a historian who taught a course on

the war at New Mexico State University at Las Cruces,
described his students as "tabula rasa" on the subject,24
and he was echoed by fellow historians.

George Herring, who

taught at the University of Kentucky, told a reporter for
the Wall Street Journal that he realized a new age had
dawned when a student innocently asked what napalm was. 25
Another historian tested his students on the first day of
class and recalled most had never heard of My Lai, the Tet

22 Washington Post, 19 April 1985, section I, p. 14.

23 Adam Clymer, "Public Opinion and Vietnam: The Enduring
Legacy," New York Times Magazine, 31 March 1985, 35.
24 Ibid., 4 o.
25 Wall Street Journal, 24 January 1985, section I, p. 1.
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Offensive or the Gulf of Tonkin. 26
The students were not alone in their ignorance.

At a

press conference in February 1982, President Ronald Reagan
said, incorrectly on all accounts, that before the 1954
Geneva settlement Vietnam had been divided into North and
South; Ho Chi Minh had avoided the elections which were to
have reunified the nation in 1956; and John Kennedy had sent
the first American combat troops to Vietnam. 27

Reagan was

more than matched, however, by a young woman not long out of
high school, training for Army airborne duty at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina.

When a reporter asked for her opinion of

the Vietnam War, she said, "It was stupid."
"Would you feel that way if we had won?" the reporter
replied.
"I thought we did win."
"When did you find out we lost?"
"Just now.

I never studied it, you know. "28

Being Able To Forget The War

26 Ibid.

27 Newsweek, "Lyndon B. Reagan on Vietnam," 3 March 1982,
30.
28 Clymer, 35.
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In the years after 1975, Americans wished to forget the
Vietnam War for understandable reasons.

People of all

political stripes found it an anxious, embarrassing memory.
It was a difficult episode to grasp as well, for its history
was long and gradual and seemed to lack a clear beginning,
middle and end.

According to one writer, "It ended as it

began, imperceptibly. ,,29

Another writer described the war

as having "a kind of nightmare geometry • • • • There was no
organizing principle, no discernible narrative line--instead
there was a web of stories . • • • ,,30

Lance Morrow, who

wrote widely on the war's legacy, said America lost the war
"ambiguously," quoting Gillespie "Sonny" Montgomery, a
conservative Congressman from Mississippi: "tWe didn't
really lose it.
sea.

They didn't overrun us or push us into the

We just fought the war in a strange way •

an issue that's past now.

. It's

Americans always want to move on

to other things.' ,,31

29 A.D. Horne, ed., The Wounded Generation
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), xi.

(Englewood

30 Kathyrn Marshall, In The Combat Zone (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1987), 14.

31 Lance Morrow, "America After Vietnam," Horizons (July
1977), 43-44.

14

The war was further muddied in memory by the
ambivalence of those who still argued it.

The left's

ambivalence seemed to be greater, the right's rather muted
but telling all the same.

In Commentary, the influential

conservative magazine, writer Robert Tucker defended his
opposition to the war and then wavered.

He called the

conflict a "classic case of an imperial war," the work of
men who wanted to preserve America's "political
preponderance," but ended by worrying about the implications
of abandoning South Vietnam. 32

His worries stemmed from an

ambivalence that grew during the war, an attitude Tucker and
others noted.

Americans had wanted to end the war, but a

hasty withdrawal or an admitted defeat were never acceptable
courses.

Henry Kissinger mentioned the same dual attitude

in his memoirs: "Thousands of decent and patriotic Americans
from every walk of life were moved to protest against an
enterprise that had exacted such a human toll.

At the same

time, poll after poll showed the overwhelming majority of
the American public unprepared to accept an outright,
.
d e f ea t • ,,33
h um1. l '1a t '1ng Amer1can

One such poll in November

1967 had shown 44 percent in favor of complete or gradual

32 Robert Tucker,
"Vietnam:
Commentary (May 1975), 28-29.

The

Final

33 Henry Kissinger, Years Of Upheaval
Brown, 1982), 84.

Reckoning,"

(Boston: Little,
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withdrawal, but 55 percent wanting a tougher, more effective
policy.34
Americans did not like losing period, and after seeing
so many of their countrymen die in Vietnam were not about to
give up the cause completely.

In his personal account of

the war, A Rumor Of War, former Marine Phillip Caputo got to
the heart of the matter, saying, "There was so much human
suffering • • • that I could not respond to it.
numbing.

I wanted to see it end.

It was

At the same time, a part

of me did not want to see it end in a North Vietnamese
victory.

I kept thinking about Levy, about Sullivan, about

all of the others, and something in me cried out against the
waste of their lives. ,,35

Writing in 1977 , political

scientists Sol Sanders and William Henderson said, "The
American people are still weary of Vietnam, and most of
us--even the doves--are at least a little touched by
feelings of guilt. ,,36
In the years to follow, a sort of left-wing repentance
became a familiar refrain.

Political writer Fred Barnes,

34 Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday Books, 1984), 24.
35 Phillip Caputo, A Rumor
Rinehart and Winston, 1977), 342.

Of

War

(New

York:

Holt,

36 Sol Sanders and William Henderson, "The Consequences
of Vietnam," Orbis (Spring 1977), 74.
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who said he voted for radical Dick Gregory in 1968 but then
had a change of heart after North Vietnam won, took such
journalistic colleagues as Walter Cronkite to task for not
doing the same. 37

The editors of the New Republic, which in

1975 had called the war evil, threw themselves at the mercy
of a forgiving God when considering it ten years later.
. • . we should be haunted by the way we deserted men
and women who clung to us out of conviction or out of
innocence, even men and women who clung to us out of
avarice or just plain fear . .
there was something
unseemly in our haste to deny them that last measure of
assistance that might have enabled them to establish
some position of strength from which they could bargain
with the enemy . . • . On what moral calculus were these
decisions made? And, given what The know today, on what
calculus are they to be defended?
After 1975, the right wing's most persistent champions
of the war were Richard Nixon and Norman Podhoretz, editor
of Commentary and author of the book Why We Were In Vietnam.
Nixon's defense of the war began in 1969, when he became
Commander in Chief.

In his memoirs he gave a cut and dried

version:
The congressional bombing cutoff, coupled with the
limitation placed on the President by the War Powers Act
of November 1973, set off a string of events that led to
a Communist takeover in Cambodia and, on April 30, 1975,
the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam. . .
Congress denied first to me, and then to President Ford,
the means to enforce the Paris agreement at a time when
the North Vietnamese were openly violating it. Even
31 Fred Barnes,
April 1985, 12.

"My Change of Heart," New Republic,

38 New Republic, 29 April 1985, 8-9.

29
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more devastating and inexcusable, in 1974 Congress began
cutting back on military aid for South Vietnam at a time
when the Soviets were increasing aid to North
Vietnam. • . • The war and peace in Indochina that
America had won at such cost over 12 years of sacrifice
and fighting were lost within a matter of months once
Congress refused to fulfill our obligations. And it is
Congress that m~st bear the responsibility for the
tragic results.
Nixon's argument was an American version of the
German "stab-in-the-back"

theory, which had blamed spineless

politicians for losing a war, World War One, thought to have
been won on the battlefield.

As Norman Podhoretz pointed

out, however, after the Tet Offensive swung public opinion
against the war in 1968 neither the Johnson nor Nixon
administrations offered further reasons for being in
Vietnam.

Instead, they talked of how best to leave.

The

effect, said Podhoretz, "was to concede the moral and
political arguments to the antiwar

forces--by now a

coalition that included people who had led the country into
Vietnam in the first place and were eager to atone by
leading it out."40

Henry Kissinger confirmed what Podhoretz

said, noting, "We did not question the desirability of
disengagement."Cl

It was a crucial point in the debate, for

39 Richard M. Nixon, Memoirs (New York: Gosset and Dunlap,
1978), 889.
40 Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were In Vietnam (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1982), 10.
Cl Kissinger, 83.
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the right wing, which embraced the war as its own when Nixon
became president, did not articulate reasons for sending
American combat troops to Vietnam in the first place.
Rather, the right settled for a moral argument best phrased
by Podhoretz, who called the war "an act of imprudent
idealism whose moral soundness has been so overwhelmingly
vindicated by the hideous consequences of our defeat."42
Possibly, such an argument rang as hollow to many
Americans as the early left-wing argument that a Communist
victory was not so terrible.

According to Podhoretz,

Americans who had seen nearly 58,000 of their countrymen die
for "imprudent idealism" were to be consoled by its "moral
soundness."

Americans were probably somewhat consoled by

the idea that the war was begun with good intentions.

John

Roche, an aide to Lyndon Johnson, said, "1 will argue to my
dying day that this was the most idealistic war we have ever
fought, fundamentally a war for an abstraction: the freedom
of a bunch of Asians at the end of the world. "43

Roche's

comment, however, underscored the probable weakness of the
conservative line as pursued by Podhoretz and himself.

To

say the war was fought out of imprudent idealism or for an

42 Podhoretz, 210.
43 John Roche, "Vietnam Ten Years Later," National Review,
3 May 1985, 44.

19
abstraction was to say, in essence, the war and its
casualties were unnecessary.

Thus, while the left

recanted, the right tried to stay firm on slippery ground.
Neither's versions were widely embraced.
This lack of political consensus made the war easier
for Americans to forget, but it would not seem to have fully
explained their amnesia.
national trauma?

For had not the war been a

When Americans thought of the war, scenes

of pain and turmoil came to mind: the My Lai massacre, the
Tet Offensive, the little girl in the famous photograph
running down the road after her village was napalmed, the
Kent State killings, the mayhem at the 1968 Democratic Party
convention in Chicago, Americans tortured in enemy cells,
veterans throwing away their purple hearts in front of the
Pentagon.

Television journalist Howard K. Smith spoke the

conventional wisdom when he ranked the war as America's
third greatest crisis, behind only the Civil War and the
Great Depression. 44

So did Myra MacPherson, author of Long

Time Passing, a social history of the war and its effects,
when she said, "As much as we yearn to put it behind us, we
cannot get over all the pain and divisions it caused. ,,45

44 Jan Scruggs, To Heal A Nation (New York: Harper and
Row, 1985), 1.
45 MacPherson, 607.
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The war had surely seemed traumatic and was remembered as
such by most who made the effort, mainly in the mass media.
A few observers, though, wondered if for most Americans
the war was not a lasting trauma, but really just a scar.
In Commentary, Charles Horner said, "The consequences of our
defeat, being neither so vivid nor so apparent as an
occupying army in the nation's capital, remind us that
whatever we lost in Vietnam, others have lost more.,,46
Gloria Emerson, author of Winners And Losers, one of the
war's first social histories (1976), said, "The country was
not particularly shattered by the war--so it is not
surprising that a healing is occurring now.
inattentive and self-absorbed people.

We are an

I suppose that

inattentiveness is also a protection of sorts.,,47

Ward

Just, who covered the war for the Washington Post and wrote
one its early novels,

Stringer, put the matter thus: The

United States was "two nations where Vietnam is
c~ncerned--those deeply touched by what happened there and

those not affected. ,,48

46 Charles Horner, "America Five Years After Defeat,"
Commentary (April 1980), 50.
41 Morrow, 43.

U Ibid., 43.
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The strongest evidence to support this line of dissent
was that the war had been largely forgotten.
a trauma, how was that possible?

If it had been

One answer may have been

that it was not truly a trauma for most Americans, or if it
was, it was a trauma played out half way around the world,
with reverberations in Washington, D.C., Cambridge and
Berkley, and in small towns when service chaplains grimly
rang the doorbell.

For the 26.8 million young men who were

eligible for the draft during the war, there was on the
average a 10 percent chance of facing combat in Vietnam,
only seven percent if one was from a family of middle or
high income, 15 percent if one was poor. 49

Most who served

in Vietnam did not see combat, instead playing a supporting
role of some kind.

While many young men found the very

prospect of the draft traumatic, while some wrestled with
their conscience, with the logistics of avoiding service or
with club-wielding policemen at anti-war rallies, this was
not the same sort of anguish as seeing a friend blown to
pieces by a Viet Cong mortar or having oneself disfigured in
similar fashion.

Generally speaking, the real trauma would

seem to have been experienced in Vietnam, where the war was,
not in the United States.

Again, those in the age group

49 Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, "The Vietnam
Generation," Horne, 6.
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most likely to be affected by the war, those of draft age,
faced only a 10 percent chance of combat.

Many, especially

college students of means, easily beat the odds.
Many Americans either too young or too old for the
draft were likely not permanently touched by the war.

A

young writer named David Bell said in 1985, "Despite hearing
about the war constantly during my childhood, from
television and student protests, the war had no real
impact on me."

He added that as a college student in 1980

he noticed little opposition among his contemporaries to
Jimmy Carter's plan for draft registration, saying the
Vietnam War "was already as alien to us personally as World
War Two or Korea."

To verify his impressions Bell

interviewed young men and women at the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial in Washington, where a 19-year-old told him, "I was
really confused when my parents said we were at war.
didn't seem like that.

It

You couldn't exactly walk down the

streets and notice it."50

A national survey in 1985

revealed that 44 percent of those polled said they did not
remember discussing the war with their family or friends
while it was being fought.

Thirty-six percent said the war

affected them "hardly at all" and 17 percent said "not in

50 David Bell, "The Lost Generation Gap," New Republic,
29 April 1985, 14.
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the least."S1
Much was made of the Vietnam War having been televised,
in all its horror, into the living rooms of America.

But a

study of the televised war showed that much less than half
the film footage was related to battle, and, the Tet
Offensive aside, only six or seven percent showed heavy
combat.

John Mueller, one of the study's authors, noted

that television existed during the Korean War and that
studies made during World War Two indicated that realistic
photographs did not change people's ideas of war.

Said

Mueller, "If you think that the war in Vietnam was a
television war, and that people turned against the war
because they saw it every night, it is equivalent to saying
that the American people are so stupid that they don't know
what war is.

People know what wars are; they do not have to

· d on t e I eV1S10n.
..
,,52
have them exp I a1ne

If most Americans did

not see the war first hand and if television did not
transmit the trauma, what was the war's true effect over
here?

Perhaps it was captured by one soldier's anectdote.

Martin Greenberg told of chatting with a young lady at a San
Francisco nightclub the evening before departing for

51 Washington Post, 15 April 1985, section I, p. 19.
5Z Lawrence Lichty, Murray Fromson and John Mueller,
Television War?" Vietnam As History, Peter Baestrup, ed.
(New York: Wilson Books, 1983), 86-88.
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Vietnam.

When he informed her of his travel plans, she

dented his romantic armor with a shrug.

Said Greenberg, ItIt

was as if I had said that I was going to a Giants game at
Candlestick. 1t53
Both the obvious and more subtle reasons for forgetting
the war--its distastefullness, confusing narrative and
minimal concrete effect on the American public--were an
explanation that was still lacking somehow.
question was begged.

Another

Even if the war was not the

indelible trauma many believed, was it not still an
important episode, one that people should have been
compelled to remember?

Americans were supposed to be

infamously ahistorical, but they did remember events like
the Civil War and World War Two, and besides, the Vietnam
War was recent, controversial, colorful in its way.
a sorry tale but good copy.

It was

Why, then, the political

amnesia?
The root of the answer may have been exposed by Joseph
Lelyveld, a writer for the New York Times Magazine.

In

examining the American memory of the war, he said, It • . •
when we talk about Vietnam we are seldom talking about the
country of that name or the situation of the people who live

53 Martin Greenberg and Augustus Norton, Touring Nam (New
York: William Morrow, 1985), 9.
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there.

Usually we are talking about ourselves.

always were."SC

Probably we

Other commentators noted the trend, the

"self-absorption" Gloria Emerson had cited.

Stanley Herman,

a doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago Divinity
School, said, " • . • our commentary on Vietnam has narrowed
into a preoccupation with American experiences of the war,"
adding that Hollywood films such as The Deerhunter and
Apocalypse Now, a growing number of war novels and the
dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington
all served to focus attention on "what the war did to us."
He said further, "This in turn has not extinguished the
smoldering debates about the meaning of the war, debates
that continue to ignore the large majority of victims--the
Vietnamese who stayed in Vietnam.

. . . Turned

inward, we

have forgotten that our national agony, however defined, was
not the principal moral fact of the war.,,55

Peter Marin,

another who explored the war's moral side, described the
Vietnamese as "stickfigures in the American dream. ,,56

A

survey in 1970, three years before America withdrew from

54 Joseph Lelyveld, "Vietnam In Retrospect,"
Times Magazine, 31 March 1985, p. 30.

New York

55 Stewart Herman, "Vietnam: Widening Our Perspective,"
Christian Century, 1 May 1985, 442.
56 Peter Marin, "Coming To Terms With Vietnam," Harper's
(December 1980), 43.
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Vietnam, showed there was no scholar in the United States
who devoted most of his or her time to studying North
Vietnam, no American university had a tenured professorship
in Vietnamese studies and fewer than 30 college students in
the entire nation studied the Vietnamese language. 51
The feelings of many Americans toward their lost ally
were expressed by one Alan "Doc" Cornett, an Army sergeant
with 20 years of service who told a reporter in 1985, "You
could lose all respect for the Vietnamese, till you fought
beside them, touched them, lived with them."

When he

arrived in Vietnam, Cornett had joined his buddies in
hurling cans of C-rations at Vietnamese civilians from a
speeding truck.

But he became fluent in the language and

two of its dialects, befriended a South Vietnamese soldier
with whom he worked as a Special Forces medic and eventually
married the man's sister.

Because he was one of the few who

really knew the Vietnamese, Cornett was one of the few who
thought of them first when recalling the war.
them, you know," he told the reporter.

"We deserted

58

American veterans of the war routinely remembered
playing with Vietnamese children or lending a hand to

51 Fox Butterfield, "The New Vietnam Scholarship," New
York Times Magazine, 13 February 1984, 30-31.
58 Clymer, 42.
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villagers.

Thomas Pelleton, an intelligence specialist with

the 101st Airborne, wrote home from Phu Bai about such
experiences.

"We played games with them, went for a walk to

the beach, took pictures, in general just loved them up.
They stole my watch, but it didn't really matter.
Just as routinely, though, one found in the war's literature
accounts of American atrocities, in which Vietnamese friend
and foe alike were treated as animals.

In his oral history

'Nam, Mark Baker was told of random rapes, killings and
tortures. 60

Lieutenant William Calley's book, His Own

Story, was numbing in its boy-next-door description of a
soldier's dehumanization. 51

In Rumor Of War, Phillip Caputo

remembered being told that one of his men had been cutting
off the ears of dead Viet Cong.

Wrote Caputo, "An image of

Hanson flashed in my mind: a quiet boy of about nineteen,
tall and thin, with dark blond hair, he was so
American-looking he could have posed for a Norman Rockwell
in the old Saturday Evening Post.

I tried to imagine him

performing the act Loker had just described, but

59 Bernard Edelman, ed., Dear America: Letters Home From
Vietnam (New York: Norton, 1985), 49.

60 Mark Baker, Nam (New York: Quill Press, 1982), 211-215.
61 William Calley, His Own Story (New York: Viking Press,
1971).
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couldn't.,,6Z

In his book Dispatches, journalist Michael

Herr repeated a well-worn joke: "What you do is, you load
all the Friendlies onto ships and take them out to the South
China Sea.

Then you bomb the country flat.

Then you sink

the ships. ,,63
Since Americans knew little of Vietnam, since American
soldiers felt little kinship with her people and since most
in the United States remembered the war's effects on their
country only, there was the strong suggestion that Vietnam
in truth meant little to America.
important.

Here again semantics were

The Vietnam War had been important because

Americans were fighting it; American lives and prestige were
on the line.

Once the war was over, however, its political

history was easily forgotten, at the behest of several
presidents, no less.

Casualties, social turmoil and

Communist re-education camps aside, the war's strategic
effects were unclear.

Cambodia and Laos were both overrun

by Communists, but Thailand and other nations in the region
did not fall like so many dominoes.

In 1979, Vietnam fought

a short border war with its recent wartime ally, China.

By

the early 1980s there were signs of tension between Vietnam

6Z Caputo, 125.
63 Michael
1977), 59.

Herr,

Dispatches

(New York:

Alfred Knopf,
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and the Soviet Union, the former seeming to resent its
principal ally's instrusiveness.
The Vietnam War had been important, but for reasons of
culture, geography and strategy, Vietnam itself may not have
been.

William Sullivan, a career diplomat and former

Ambassador to Laos, spoke of the war in retrospect as an
inevitable result of the Cold War .
• . we were damned lucky it happened in a place that
didn't matter all that much, like Indochina. Had we
taken a stand in a place like Hungary, it could have
blown up the world, including the United States.
Fifty-eight thousand lives is too many to pay for a
lesson, but it's probably smaller than we might have
paid had we gone into Czechoslovakia in '68, or done
something else that would have led to a direct
confrontation with the Soviets or the Chinese. 64
Such a clash, if not an Armageddon, would surely have
been remembered in political detail.
not.

The Vietnam War was

The failure to achieve its purpose--an independent,

non-Communist South Vietnam--was mourned but not met with
alarm.

It is possible, perhaps likely, that the war's

history was forgotten because few were pressed to remember.

64 Kim Willenson, ed., The Bad War
American Library, 1987), 385.

(New York:

The New

CHAPTER 2
THE VETERANS REMEMBER

Meaninglessness

In his novel Fragments, Vietnam veteran Jack Fuller
described a soldier's uncomfortable homecoming.

At

breakfast with his mother and father the morning after
returning from the war, the soldier got news that was
supposed to be sensitive.
"John Russell was over in Vietnam," said my mother.
"Do you remember him?"
"The name," I said.
"Sure.
John Russell.
He was
a year or two behind me, I think."
"He was killed there," my mother said softly.
"Fuckit," I said.
Said Fuller's soldier as the narrative continued, "When I
looked up and saw their faces, I realized what I had said,
not only the word but the way it sounded, and I was sorry. "I
Fuller's fictional scene dramatized the gap between the
minority of Americans who had seen the war and the majority
who had not, the "two countries" Ward Just had noted.

The

same sort of gap had been mentioned by writers of previous
modern wars.

Poet Karl Shapiro, who fought in the Second

World War, spoke of "the majority, untouched by steel or

1 Jack Fuller,
165-167.

Fragments

(New York:
30

William Murrow,

1984),
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psychoneurosis. "2

Writing of the First World War, e.e.

cummings described those who "don't and never never will
know, they don't want to, no •

. . .,,3

In Dispatches,

Michael Herr recalled a Marine in Hue who grabbed him
forcibly as the writer was leaving the city, and implored
him to "tell it," to describe the war truthfully for the
uninitiated.

Herr said other soldiers did the same "with an

emotion whose intensity would shock you • • • because they
really did have the feeling that it wasn't being told for
them, that they were going through all of this and that
somehow no one back in the World knew about it."(
Herr and fellow journalists did tell about the war in
critically acclaimed books, but much of its literature came
from the soldiers themselves.

Wrote George Herring, "One

must go back to World War One to find a body of war
literature as personal and introspective as that produced by
the Vietnam War.,,5
parallel.

A number of Vietnam veterans saw the

Poet R.L. Barth wrote this:

You watch with me: Owen, Blunden, Sassoon.

1 Thomas J. Walsh, American War Literature (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1980), 182.
3 Ibid., 272.

( Herr, 206-207.
5 George Herring, "Vietnam Remembered," Journal of
American History (June 1986), 152.

32
Through sentry duty, everything you meant
Thickens to fear of nights without a moon.
War's war.

We are, my friends, no different. 6

In his surrealistic Vietnam War novel Going After
Cacciato, veteran Tim O'Brien began with a quote from
Siegfried Sassoon: "Soldiers are dreamers."?

Phillip Caputo

began the epilogue to A Rumor Of War by quoting Sassoon
also. 8

When asked at a writer's conference why the

literature of the two wars seemed so similar, O'Brien
replied, "An absence of clear purpose is the easiest
answer. "9
Such an absence of purpose or meaning has helped define
modern war literature in general.

It is well known as a

theme in First World War books such as All Quiet On The
Western Front and A Farewell To Arms, but it appears in
earlier and later works, too: War And Peace, The Red Badge
Of Courage and The Downfall by Emile Zola in the nineteenth

6 John Topham, ed., Vietnam Literature Anthology: A
Balanced Perspective (Philadelphia: American Poetry and
Literature Press, 1985), 43.
? Tim O'Brien, Going After Cacciato (New York: Delacorte
Press, 1978).
8 Caputo, 338.
9 Freedman, 55.
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century10, and The Naked And The Dead, Catch 22 and the
Korean War film MASH in the twentieth.
Samuel Freedman, a journalist who studied Vietnam War
literature, said of its authors, "Their art is a search for
that final, missing piece,"11 something to illuminate an
unclear experience.

According to W. D. Ehrhart, one of the

more well-known Vietnam veteran poets,

"For anyone who's

been through an extremely traumatic experience, there's a
driving need to explore it, to understand it.
turmoil inside.

There is a

Those of us who could, articulated it with

writing, painting, whatever."a

John Ketwig, another

veteran and author of And A Hard Rain Fell, wrote, "I only
know that I'm searching for something, I have to find it,
and I don't even know what it is.,,13

In Fragments, Jack

Fuller described the search as such:

Fragments • • • • You tried in vain to make
connections. You yearned for explanations,
exculpations. You remembered the details, the moments
of horror. But you remembered the closeness, too, your
pure mortal reliance on others. And no matter how you

10 Sophus Keith Winter, The Realistic War Novel (Seattle:
University of Washington Bookstore, 1930), 8.
11 Freedman, 51.
12 Ibid.
13 John Ketwig, And A Hard Rain Fell (New York: MacMillan,
1985), 294.
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put the fragments together, they did not make a whole. 14
Complicating the search for some veterans who wrote was
the common attitude that the Vietnam War, or any war, was
meaningless.

Men who had seen combat sometimes had no

patience with abstract political explanations.

Said Phillip

Caputo, "I was finished with governments and their abstract
causes, and I would never again allow myself to fall under
the charms and spells of political witch doctors like John
F. Kennedy."15

Some writers had trouble finding any

explanation other than that the war was pure madness.

In

his novel Meditations In Green, veteran Stephen Wright
described a cut-and-paste magazine collage on a soldier's
wall in Vietnam, a creation meant to communicate the idea of
insanity:
There would be much to ponder: presidents and
penises, officers and orifices, history as an
illustrated stroke book, from the ancient mamasan in
conical hat and black latex to last year's Playmate of
the Year from whose glossy pink ass a stick of
five-hundred-pound bombs dropped onto a football field
mined with pizzas where one team marked AFL rushed
another team marked NLF for possession of the oversized
head of Mickey Mouse decapitated by the blades of a
Cobra helicopter streaming rockets into the U.S. C~itol
dome that was a beanie on the head of Ho Chi Minh.

14 Fuller, 153.
15 Caputo, 332.
16 Stephen Wright, Meditations In Green (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1983), 121.
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The jungle warfare of Vietnam seemed to further obscure
meaning.

Phillip Caputo wrote, "Because of the sporadic,

confused nature of the fighting, it is impossible to give an
orderly account of what we did.

With one or two exceptions,

I have only disjointed recollections of this period, the
spring of 1965.

The incidents I do remember, I remember

vividly; but I can come up with no connecting threads to tie
events neatly together."1!

In Going After Cacciato, Tim

O'Brien produced this much-quoted passage:
They did not even know the simple things: A sense
of victory, or satisfaction, or necessary sacrifice.
They did not know the feeling of taking a place and
keeping it, securing a village and then raising the flag
and calling it victory. No sense of order or momentum.
No front, no rear, no trenches laid out in neat
parallels. No Patton rushing for the Rhine, no
beachheads to storm and win and hold for the duration.
They did not have targets. They did not have a cause.
They did not know if it was a war of ideology or
economics or hegemony or spite. On a given day, they
did not know whether they were in Quang Ngai, or how
being there might influence larger outcomes.
They did
not know the names of most villages.
They did not know
which villages were critical. They did not know
strategies. They did not know the terms of tThe war, its
architecture, the rules of fair play • • •
"
Jan Barry, a veteran and poet, described in A Nun In
Ninh Hoa how strange and exotic Vietnam seemed to Americans.
The Buddhist nun in the poem self-immolated in protest
against the South Vietnamese government, an act Barry said

17 Caputo, 96.
18 O'Brien, 128.
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was "quite a sight for a boy from Tennessee
poem's last line is, "Jeesus!
place? "19

"

The

How'd we get in this crazy

John Del Vecchio, author of the novel The

Thirteenth Valley, called Vietnam a place "where stars are
dim and do not twinkle. "20
The theme of senselessness was at the heart of the 1979
film Apocalypse Now, one of Hollywood's splashier attempts
at capturing the Vietnam War.

Marlon Brando played the role

of a Green Beret colonel driven crazy by the war, living in
the jungle among Montagnard tribesmen who believed him to be
a god.

As a special American unit works its way up the

Mekong River to dispense with the renegade officer, scenes
of madness unfold, one of the most memorable showing
soldiers surfing in the midst of a helicopter raid on a Viet
Cong inlet.

The war was depicted in a like manner on stage.

In playwright and veteran David Rabe's war trilogy,
appearing from 1969 to 1977, mindless destruction was the
lietmotif.

In Sticks And Bones, a blind veteran slit his

wrists, and both Streamers and The Basic Training Of Pavlo
Hummel ended with soldiers murdering comrades. 21

19 W.D. Ehrhart, ed., Carrying The Darkness: Vietnam War
Poetry (New York: Avon Books, 1985), 27.
20 John Del Vecchio, The Thirteenth Valley (New York:
Bantam Books, 1982), 108.
21 Freedman, 53.
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Michael Herr was perhaps the most vivid in showing the
war as madness.

Employing an unusual and compelling style,

Herr wrote parts of his true account Dispatches while
undergoing psychotherapy.

In the New York Times Review Of

Books, critic Roger Sale said, "Herr at his best hurls one
into his experience, insists an uninitiated reader be
comforted with no politics, no certain morality, no clear
outline of history."22

Herr's style was an extension of a

belief he stated in Dispatches: "Conventional journalism
could no more reveal this war than conventional firepower
could win it, all it could do was take the most profound
event of the American decade and turn it into a
communications pudding, taking its most obvious, undeniable
history and making it into a secret history."23

The

"obvious, undeniable" history was the war's immediate
effects of death and destruction and dehumanization.

The

secret history, in Herr's view, would have been politics and
strategic rationale.

Herr elaborated on this idea toward

the end of his book: "It seemed now that everybody knew
someone who had been in Vietnam and didn't want to talk
about it.

Maybe they just didn't know how.

People I'd meet

22 John Hellman, American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 165.
23 Herr, 218.
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would take it for granted that I was articulate, ask me if I
minded, but usually the questions were political, square,
innocent, they already knew what they wanted to hear, I'd
practically forgotten the language."Z4
Herr was revealing an essential point in modern
writing, that language could not convey the ghastliness,
surrealism and absurdity of war.

This view was a rebellion

against traditional history, arguing that a graphic,
tangible and human portrayal was much truer than political
abstractions.

Writers who took this view wanted no tidy

versions of an untidy affair.

However, Michael Herr and

others wondered if even the bluntest, most untraditional
style could make the untouched masses comprehend war.

Herr

noted that when looking at war pictures in Life magazine as
a child, "something wasn't clear at all, something repressed
that monitored the images and withheld their essential
• I didn't have a language for it

information.
then.

"Z5

Veteran Jack Strahan addressed the same idea

in his poem Dialogues With A Reporter:
How can you comprehend,
among your short and easy questions,
the meaning of this word, fear,

24 Ibid., 251.
Z5 Ibid., 18.
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or the lack of feelings which start
somewhere in your mind and travel
slowly toward your gut where
helplessness is not a word,
but a knowledge of playing out slowly,
an idiocy of men dying openly,
who did not wonder how or why,
or if someone like yourself
would be along later asking these
questions in your embarrassed voice?"26
W.D. Ehrhart wrote a similar poem, Imagine, in which he
described his questioners trying to imagine war:
They listened, and they strained
to visualize the words:
newsreels and photographs, books
and Wilfred Owen tumbled
through their minds.
Pulses quickened.
They didn't notice, as he talked,
his eyes, as he talked,
his eyes beginning to focus
through the wall, at nothing,
or at something inside.

26 Topham, 29.
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When he finished speaking,
someone asked him:
had he ever killed?27
Perhaps the most famous passage in war literature to
argue against abstractions was Ernest Hemingway's in
Farewell To Arms.

A

His protagonist Frederick Henry said,

"Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow
become obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the
numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of
regiments and the dates.,,28

Much of the Vietnam War's

literature was mundane in its concrete detail.

In Going

After Cacciato, Tim O'Brien wrote, "Over the next week they
destroyed twelve tunnels.

They killed a water buffalo.

They burned rice and shot chickens and scattered jugs of
grain.

They trampled paddies.

Tore up fences.

Dumped dirt

into wells, diverted ditches, provoked madness. ,,29

One of

the novel's chapters bore the simple title How Bernie Lynn
Died After Frenchie Tucker. 30

Like an extended tour of

combat, the effect was numbing.

27 Timothy J. Lomperis, ed., Reading The Wind (Durham,
N.C.: The Asia Society,Duke University, 1987), 29.
28 Frank McConnell,
August 1985, 441.
29 O'Brien, 105.
30 Ibid ., 66.

"A Name For Loss," Commonweal, 9
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Jack Fuller pointed to a soldier's phrase that appears
repeatedly in the war's literature: "It don't mean nothing."
Wrote Fuller, "It was one of those things you said to one
another for comfort, one of those things you really wanted
to believe.
nothin'.

A guy in another unit got greased.

Don't mean

A round pierced your canteen and at first you

weren't sure whether the dark stain spreading across your
fatigues was water or blood.
survived, didn't you?

Don't mean nothin'.

You

Don't mean nothin' at all.,,31

Meaning

While the theme of meaninglessness haunted
Vietnam War writers, most persisted in their search for
meaning of a kind.

They were compelled to believe that such

a traumatic experience as war offered something in the way
of enlightenment.

Robert Jay Lifton, a psychologist who

studied veterans and their problems, recalled listening to a
triple amputee testify before a U.S. Senate subcommittee
about the difficulties of getting proper medical treatment.
The veteran spoke also of another problem--his doubts that

31 Fuller, 14.
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his sacrifice had meant anything.

He later told Lifton he

wanted to run for political office in his native deep South.
When Lifton asked if a dissident such as himself were
electable in that region, the veteran replied, "I'm no
dissident!
war.,,3Z

I've got to believe there was some value in that

Addressing the peace movement, a soldier who wrote

his hometown newspaper from Vietnam uttered a similar
sentiment: "Don't shout and preach your nothingness to
me. ,,33
Usually, as George Herring had noted in comparing the
literature of the Vietnam War and World War One, veterans
who wrote found a sort of personal, introspective meaning.
The writers were aware of this and made no excuses.

In his

prologue to A Rumor Of War, Phillip Caputo wrote, "This book
does not pretend to be history.

It has nothing to do with

politics, power, strategy, influence, national interests, or
foreign policy • • • • In a general sense, it is simply a
story about war, about the things men do in war and the
things war does to them."H

In his personal account Once A

Warrior King, former Army officer David Donovan said much

3Z Robert Jay Lifton, "The Postwar War,
Issues, vol. 31, no. 4 (1975), 188-189.
33 Edelman, 227.
34 Caputo, xi.
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the same: "I and • • . other Americans lived there alone and
fought our own little war.

This book portrays my memory of

that experience • • • • It eschews the finer topics of
international politics, military strategy, global economics,
and who did what to whom first.

These subjects are well

worn and only lead to endless debate and disagreement,
achieving nothing. "35

Mark Baker, in the preface to 'Nam,

said, "This book is not the Truth about Vietnam.

Everyone

holds a piece of that puzzle. "36
In response to a journalist's question, Tim O'Brien
explored the matter of personal versus political
remembrance.

"When you think about novels about the war,"

he said, "they're rarely political.
confront are personal, not political.

Because the issues you
Staying alive,

burning a village, watching the bombs fall.

The primary

things one cares about in battle aren't the political
issues.

It's being scared, being brave.

things that go back to Homer.
things. "31

Those are the

Those are the ancient

0' Brien was among the most profound of the

veterans who searched for meaning, quoting Plato and

35 David Donovan, Once A Warrior King (New York: McGrawHill, 1985), viii.
36 Baker, 16.
37 Freedman, 55.

44
Socrates in his ruminations.

In both the fictional Going

After Cacciato and the nonfictional If I Die In A Combat
Zone, O'Brien found meaning in personal courage.

The latter

contained a long, philosophical passage that analyzed the
quality:
Courage is more than the charge. More than dying
or suffering the loss of a love in silence or being
gallant.
It is temperament and, more, wisdom • • • • It
is more likely that men act cowardly and, at other
times, act with courage, each in different measure, each
with varying consistency. The men who do well on the
average, perhaps with one moment of glory, those men are
brave . . • • The bullets stop • • • • You tentatively
peek up, wondering if it is the end • • • • The fright
dies the same way novocaine wears off in the dentist's
chair. You promise, almost moving your lips, to do
better next time; that by itself is a kind of courage. 38
In Going After Cacciato, the protagonist Paul Berlin
reflected thus:
Yes, the issue was courage. It always had been,
even as a kid.
Things scared him. He couldn't help
it..
The real issue was the power of will to
defeat fear . • • • Somehow working his way into that
secret chamber of the human heart, where, in tangles,
lay the circuitry for all that was possible, the full
range of what a man might be • • • • ~here was a Silver
Star twinkling somewhere inside him.
In The Thirteenth Valley, John Del Vecchio's soldiers
sought meaning in the war diversely, even hazarding
political explanations, though more typical was the comment,

38 Tim O'Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone (New York: Dell
Publishing, 1979), 141.

39 O'Brien, Cacciato, 81.
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"Our ultimate goal . . • is ta remain alive. ,,40

Del Vecchio

frequently used a saltier version of the phrase Jack Fuller
used in Fragments: "Fuck it.

Don't mean nothin'."

Vecchio called it the "mantra of the infantry. ,,41

Del
At his

novel's end, though, the phrase and its message were
challenged.

When a soldier learned from his new company

commander that the former commander and several colleagues
presumed to be dead are considered missing in action, the
soldier cynically and automatically said, "Fuck it.
mean •

. . ."

Don't

Whereupon the new commander cut him off with,

"Don't say it, soldier.,,42

Del Vecchio did not offer an

explanation of the war, but he did suggest meaning was not
completely absent.
The film The Deerhunter seemed to suggest the same upon
its release in 1978.

The story focused on three steelworker

friends from western Pennsylvania who enthusiastically went
to Vietnam together.

One was disabled, one killed himself

playing Russian roulette, one was rendered emotionally
withdrawn.

Though the film was stark in its depiction of

war, it ended on a faintly hopeful note.

As the two

survivors and friends gathered to eat after burying the dead

40 Del Vecchio, 365.
41 Ibid., 476.

42 Ibid., 517.
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man, one absentmindedly began humming God Bless America, and
the others slowly followed with words, sung in haunting
fashion.

It was not a rousing finish, but it was enough to

imply the three soldiers had not suffered meaninglessly.
Released just three years after Saigon fell, The Deerhunter
did not loudly proclaim duty and patriotism as the Vietnam
War's meaning, or the meaning of war in general.

But it may

have suggested as much in a qualified way.

Personalizing The War

By looking inward for meaning, those who wrote about
the Vietnam War naturally personalized their accounts.
Instead of dwelling on causes or ideology, they dwelled on
people, individuals.

This tendency was explained by Phillip

Caputo in A Rumor Of War, in a passage about a chaplain who
was concerned about the casualty rate.
chaplain,

It • • •

Said Caputo to the

twelve KIAs [killed in action] in two
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months isn't bad."
The chaplain answered emotionally, "That's twelve
wrecked homes.

Twelve wrecked homes, lieutenant • • •

Twelve KIAs is pretty bad for the families of those dead
marines. "43
After the exchange Caputo considered the chaplain's
words: "Twelve wrecked homes.

I thought about Sullivan's

young widow in Pennsylvania, and a chill passed through
me. "44
At the beginning of his book Caputo gave his own
personal history, telling how he was from suburban
Westchester, Illinois, outside of Chicago, a place, he
wrote, that had "everything a suburb is supposed to have:
sleek, new schools smelling of fresh plaster and floor wax;
supermarkets full of Wonder Bread and Bird's Eye frozen
peas .•• ,,45

Veteran Michael Anania gave a similar

description of middle America in his poem A Second-Hand
Elegy, about young men in their last idyll before going to
Vietnam:
•.• riding through Dayton on a Saturday night
making the rounds, block by block,

43 Caputo, 178.
H Ibid.,

180.

45 Ibid., 4.

48

the car radio marking time-Downtown

Downtown--

the evening blush of neon blooming
into damp city air, the blue
clarity of mercury-lamp arcades;
four of them slouched in a Chevrolet
exhaust the evening, waiting for something to
happen. 46
Ron Kovic described his own prewar idyll in his
nonfictional Born On The Fourth Of July, in which he
lovingly spoke of his childhood in the suburbs of Dwight
Eisenhower's and John Kennedy's America.

He wrote of

idolizing Mickey Mantle and the New York Yankees, watching
Howdy Doody, Roy Rogers and Elvis Presley on television,
firmly embracing his Catholic faith, seeing The Sands Of Iwo
Jima and other John Wayne films, playing soldier with
plastic guns and hand grenades, feeling shock and wounded
pride when the Russians launched Sputnik.

Said Kovic, "When

the Fourth of July came, there were fireworks going off all
over the neighborhood.

It was the most exciting time of the

year for me next to Christmas.

Being born on the same day

as my country I thought was really great.

46 Ehrhart, 1.

I was so

49
proud. ,,47
A book that personalized the war much as any was
Friendly Fire, by C.D.B. Bryan.

Friendly Fire was the true

story of Gene and Peg Mullen, who ran a family farm near La
Porte City, Iowa, and whose son Michael was accidentally
killed by South Vietnamese artillery fire.

Beyond

describing Michael in all his shades, Bryan does the same
for his parents to an even greater extent, telling how they
raised their son, counseled him on going to Vietnam, reacted
to the news of his death, conducted their own inquiry into
the matter to discover the whole truth and later joined the
antiwar movement.

Generally speaking, Bryan told the tale

of just one of Phillip Caputo's "wrecked homes" in studious
detail.

He delved into the family's history as far back as

Gene Mullen's grandfather, saying a .photograph shows not "a
maudlin old man hugging his grandchildren; it is a
photograph of a pioneer. ,,48

There was a passage about

Gene's father, Oscar, revealing how he wanted to be a
baseball player, not a farmer, and how he left the farm to
become the groundskeeper for the Waterloo, Iowa, minor

47 Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1976), 36-45.
48 C.D.B. Bryan, Friendly Fire (New York: Putnam, 1976),

31.
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league team. 49

Gene Mullens was his father's seriousminded

opposite, a quiet, sincere man who resuscitated the farm and
sent Michael, his oldest son, to college so he could apply
business theory to the operation when it someday became his.
Michael had the same love for the land that his
father did.
When Gene walks his fields, he will
sometimes pause and wonder whether his
great-grandfather might have walked that same section,
or his grandfather • • . • it was that sense of
continuity which was, perhaps, the strongest link
between Gene, as father, and Michael, his son.
Gene
never felt Michael was to fall heir to acres only.
He
was to inherit all those generations of Mullins and
Dobshires who would walk beside him each time he turned
the soil . . . . Mifihael was always the one to have
received the farm.
In writing of Michael Mullen's status and
responsibility within his family, Bryan attempted to show
the true human impact of a single death.

There were

countless other personalizations in the war's literature.
In Winners And Losers, Gloria Emerson examined numerous
people who were somehow touched by the war, for example, a
veteran who went by the name Weasel and lived in a
junkyard. 51

Poet Bryan Alec Floyd wrote a series of poems

named after fallen comrades: Private Ian Godwin, Sergeant
Brandon Just, Corporal Charles Chungtu, Lance Corporal

49 Ibid., 32-33.

50 Ibid., 35.
51 Gloria Emerson, Winners and Losers (New York: Random
House, 1976), 89.
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Purdue Grace, Private Jack Smith, Captain James Leson,
Corporal Kevin Spina, Private First Class Brooks
Morgenstein. 52

Writer Heather Brandon produced a book

entitled Casualties which focused on familes who, like the
Mullens of Friendly Fire, lost sons and brothers in the war.
In her introduction, Brandon wrote, "What America doesn't
see are the surviving families that now dread the unspoken
words and melancholy that surround their holidays.

What

America doesn't see are the 57,939 shrines of pictures and
medals, in houses and apartments from Maine to Hawaii,
Alaska to Puerto Rico, Chicago to New Orleans • • • • What
America doesn't see are the 115,878 mothers and fathers, the
231,756 grandparents, the uncounted brothers, sisters,
daughters, sons, friends and lovers • • .

Lynda Van

Devanter, a nurse in Vietnam, wrote A Piece Of My Heart, a
book about nurses in the war.

"I was amazed that fifteen

thousand women had been in Vietnam," she wrote, "and yet I
had heard nothing about them in the "aftermath of the war."54
Black journalist Wallace Terry wrote an oral history,

52 Ehrhart, 108-118.
53 Heather Brandon, Casualties (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1984), xviii-xix.
54 Lynda Van Devanter, A Piece of My Heart (New York:
Beaufort Books, 1983), 2.

52
Bloods, about black soldiers during and after the war. 55
In the main, the few Americans who truly remembered the
Vietnam War, most of them veterans, did so personally,
subjectively, shunning political abstractions.

In most of

these accounts neither the Vietnamese nor the war's history
was forgotten.

Vietnamese soldiers and villagers were fully

dimensional characters in both the fiction and nonfiction.
In Going After Cacciato there was even a North Vietnamese
draft resister, whose words had a familiar ring: "A whole
future destroyed • • • . Ruined by a war I never cared about,
never even thought about."56

Nearly all the writings,

including the most personalized, were informed by politics
and history to some degree.

But the literature tended to

look inward, for after all, the writers were telling their
own stories.

They concentrated on what the war did to

themselves and their comrades, on how Americans were
affected.

By and large this was honest self-reflection, not

xenophobic self-absorption.

The veterans who put pen to

paper were searching for meaning in a cause the American
public had laid aside after 1975, or perhaps after 1973.

55 Wallace Terry, Bloods (New York: Random House, 1984).
56 O'Brien, Cacciato, 96.

CHAPTER 3
THE PUBLIC REMEMBERS THE VETERANS

From Scapegoats To Romantic Heroes

The frosty, sometimes harsh reception of veterans
returning from Vietnam had by the late 1970s become a
well-known tale.

Most veterans quietly re-entered society,

their service neither honored nor openly scorned, but some
remembered moments of contempt or abuse.

As one writer

said, they had been "tarred with the brush of My Lai,"
collectively blamed for atrocities and other dark aspects of
the war, or simply for losing it. 1

Ron Kovic, who was

disabled in the war, remembered being neglected in a
Veterans Administration hospital.
"I'm a Vietnam
fought in Vietnam and
decently.
"Vietnam," the
mean nothin' to me or
can take your Vietnam

veteran," he told an aide.
"I
I've got a right to be treated
aide said loudly.
"Vietnam don't
any of these other people. You
and shove it up your ass.,,2

Vietnam veterans were not completely forgotten in the

1 Tracy Kidder, "Soldiers of Misfortune," Atlantic
Monthly (March 1978), 43.

2 Kovic, 116.
53
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early and mid-1970s.

Occasionally a story would appear in

the media about the plight of veterans, and as early as 1971
a writer named Murray Polner wrote a book entitled No
Victory Parades, a study of nine veterans from low and
middle class backgrounds. 3
The same year, folk singer John Prine recorded two
songs sympathetic to veterans.

Sam Stone was the story of

a veteran who could not adjust to civilian life and
eventually overdosed on heroin. 4

In Take The Star Out Of

The Window, Prine sang this:
Hello California, hello Dad and Mom
Ship ahoy, your baby boy is home from Vietnam
Don't you ask me any questions
about the medals on my chest
Take the star out of the window,
let my conscience take a rest."5
According to several studies, the majority of Vietnam
veterans fared reasonably well upon returning home, in
contrast to their image as violent, drug-ridden outcasts.

3 John Newman, ed., Vietnam War Literature: An Annotated
Bibliography (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarcrow Press, 1982), 75.
4 John Prine, Sam Stone, Atlantic Publishing Company,
1971.
5 John Prine, Take The Star Out Of The Window, Atlantic
Publishing Company, 1971.
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Journalist Tracy Kidder cited a Veterans Administration
study that showed only one veteran in five having had
serious problems with marriage, employment, drugs or the
law. 6

A study in 1985 by the Washington Post and ABC News

showed that more than half of all veterans had gone back to
school after leaving the service; a veteran was more likely
to have attended college than most his age.

Only seven

percent were unemployed, roughly the national average.
Seventy-five percent made over $20,000 a year in salary and
seventy-eight percent owned homes.
had children.

Most were married and

When asked if they had benefitted from their

service in Vietnam, 56 percent said yes, 29 percent no.
Combat veterans, however, had met with a harder time.
Forty-one percent had been divorced, 44 percent claimed to
have suffered a drinking problem. 7
The larger problem for Vietnam veterans, it seemed, was
not so much social status as it was a feeling of not being
recognized for doing their duty and fighting in an unpopular
war.

A veteran who referred to himself as "more

conservative than liberal" told a journalist, "Understand
me, man, I went in as GI Joe, hot to save America from the
Communists.

I spent 11 months in 'Nam and got the Bronze

6 Kidder, 44.
7 Washington Post, 14 April, 1985, section I, p. 11.

56

Star.

Now I'm back and I find I've been had.

job and I'm nobody's hero.
be?"S

Sure I'm bitter.

I've got no
Shouldn't I

Another veteran told his psychiatrist, "They think

you'r,e crazy or a fool for going in the first place.

Look,

...

we all know what the outcome of all that fighting was.
I thought when I went it was for the country.

But it was

for nothing and all those guys got killed and shot to pieces
and there's no monuments.

Nobody remembers or says anything

about them." 9
Still another veteran said, "If we weren't failures,
why aren't there any monuments?

Can you name any of the

Marines who, in another war, would have been heroes?
remember any celebrations when we got back?

Do you

How come I feel

like I did something wrong, like holding up a bank, when
someone asks about my shrapnel wound?

How come I can't

tell anyone I am proud to have fought for my country without
wondering what they will think of me?"lO
In one of the most anthologized Vietnam War poems,
Relative Thing, W.D Ehrhart addressed the matter bitterly:
We are the ones you sent to fight a war

8 EIdson McGhee, "Home From Vietnam--The Plight Of A
Vietnam Veteran," Crisis (June 1976), 220.
9 Jeffrey A. Jay, "In Pursuit Of Scapegoats," Harper's
(July 1978), 15.
10 Ibid., 18.
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You didn't know a thing about • • • •
We have seen Democracy on Zippo raids
Burning hooches to the ground,
Driving eager Amtraks through a farmer's fields.
We are the ones who have to live
With the memory that we were the instruments
Of your pigeon-breasted fantasies • • • •
Those of us that lived
Have tried to tell you what went wrong.
Now you think you do not have to listen.
Just because we will not fit
Into the uniforms of photographs
Of you at twenty-one
Does not mean you can disown us.
We are your sons, America,
And you cannot change that.
When you awake,
We will still be here. 11
In late 1978 and early 1979 the nation began to
recognize and honor the Vietnam veteran.

While a greater

number of media stories on veterans may have then shown that
the recognition was inevitable, several developments
hastened the process.

In April 1979 The Deerhunter won a

11 Edelman, 231-233.
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number of Academy awards, including Best Picture.

Its chief

competition was seen to be another Vietnam War film, Coming
Home, which starred former antiwar activist Jane Fonda as
the wife of a gung-ho Marine officer, who fell in love with
an embittered veteran confined to a wheelchair.
Simplistically, Coming Home was seen to be critical of the
war and those warriors who believed in it, The Deerhunter
less so, or perhaps even laudatory.

As fate would have it,

the presenter of the Best Picture award was John Wayne,
Fonda's opposite number in the Hollywood war debate and star
of the 1968 film The Green Berets, a positive depiction of
America in Vietnam.

Dying of cancer, Wayne was spared one

last agony when Fonda's film did not win.
called The Deerhunter "racist"

Afterwards, Fonda

in its portrayal of the

Vietnamese, and a debate ensued among intellectuals and
movie critics.

Gloria Emerson said the film's director,

Michael Cimino, had "cheapened and degraded and diminished
the war as no one else has."

Fellow war correspondent and

author Ward Just called it "a slick and disgraceful
failure. "12
Emerson's and Just's criticisms were aimed at the
film's historical inaccuracies, such as the Vietnamese being

12 Lance Morrow, "Vietnam Comes Home," Time, 23 April,
1979, 22-24.
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shown as devoted to Russian roulette.

Others overlooked the

flaws or were not aware of them and were moved by The
Deerhunter's tale of redblooded Americans shattered by the
war.

John Ketwig was reminded of his own experiences in

Vietnam and " . • . started shaking uncontrollably, and then
I was crying, and I had to leave the theater for a
cigarette. ,,13

Ironically, The Deerhunter and Coming Home

shared something significant: in different ways, they were
sympathetic towards veterans and put them in the national
spotlight.
The other main development in recognizing Vietnam
veterans was the Iranian hostage crisis of November 1979,
which sparked a resurgence of nationalism and a kinder view
of the military.

Angry demonstrations against Iranians took

place across the country, with 1,500 Texans marching in
front of the Iranian consulate in Houston and a crowd in
Springfield, Massachusetts, throwing rocks, bottles and eggs
at Iranian students who marched against the Shah of Iran.
George Ball, Undersecretary of State for John Kennedy and
Lyndon Johnson and a famous early critic of the Vietnam War,
said, "In terms of domestic politics, this has put an end to
the Vietnam syndrome," the national self-doubt over

13 Ketwig, 32.
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America's role in world affairs. 1(

John White, national

chairman of the Democratic Party, said, "We may have reached
a turning point in our attitude toward ourselves, and that
is a feeling that we have a right to protect legitimate
American interests anywhere in the world. "15
When the crisis ended in January 1981 and the former
hostages were welcomed as returning heroes, Vietnam veterans
noted the contrast between their own reception and the one
unfolding.

Said one veteran, "When I got back from Vietnam

with shrapnel in both of my legs I was considered a
drug-crazed babykiller.

When the hostages come back they

get a giant applause--for what?
what.

It's damned unfair. "16

For getting caught, that's
Other veterans voiced the

same sentiment in the media, and sympathy for them steadily
mounted.

Robert Muller, a founder of the Vietnam Veterans

of America, called the hostages' return "'the single most
important event to benefit Vietnam veterans.,"17
Observers noted the change in public attitude toward
veterans.

Myra MacPherson said she was "stunned at how the

14 Hedrick Smith, "Crisis Alters Attitudes In U.S.," New
York Times, 29 November, 1979, section I, p. 1.
15 Ibid.
16 Washington Post, 31 January, 1981, section I, p. 9.
11 MacPherson, 56.
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public's awareness of Vietnam veterans had changed
dramatically in less than two years--from 1979 to 1981 ... 18 .
James Webb, veteran, war novelist and later Ronald Reagan's
Secretary of the Navy, recalled two different tours he made
in promoting his books:
I did a hardback tour in the fall of '78 and a paperback
tour in in the summer of '79 . . • • And the difference
in one year was phenomenal.
I was lucky to get out of
Boston alive in '78.
I was called a murderer.
I was
asked if I shot heroin, the whole bit.
In 1978 in
Milwaukee I was doing a call-in show and a guy actually
stopped the show and broke for a commerical and turned
around and said, 'Do you realize you're the first guy
who ever came in here without first apologizing for
having been in Vietnam?' That was in 1978. Yet by 1979,
the mood was dififerent. The whole attitudinal referent
was different."
In June 1979, the nation celebrated Vietnam Veterans
Week.

President Jimmy Carter spoke to a gathering of

veterans at the White House, saying the United States was
"ready to change its heart, its mind and its attitude about
the men who fought the war . . . • We love you for what you
were and what you stood for--and we love you for what you
are and what you stand for."

The commemorative week was

the work of nineteen Congressmen who served in Vietnam.&O

18 Ibid.
19 Horne, 152.
20 Time, 11 June, 1979, 21.
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By the spring of 1981, after the return of the hostages
in Iran, the honoring of Vietnam veterans was in full swing.
On April 26, a national day of recognition was proclaimed by
President Ronald Reagan after veterans had complained
about their treatment in comparison to the hostages,.21

In

October a number of rock and roll performers, including the
enormously popular Bruce Springsteen, donated the proceeds
of a concert in Los Angeles to the Vietnam Veterans of
America. 2Z

Half of the December 14 issue of Newsweek

formed a 20,000-word special report on the survivors of an
American unit in Vietnam, Charlie Company, recounting their
experiences during and after the war. 23

Noted the New

Republic, "In the press, concern over indifferences toward
the Vietnam veteran has reached epidemic proportions. ,,24
Samuel Freedman wrote an article in the New York Times
which examined the Vietnam veteran's transformation in the
public eye, from war criminal in the 1960s to gun-toting
drug addict in the 1970s to romantic hero in the 1980s.
Freedman noted that many of the movies, novels, plays and

21 Washington Post, 27 April, 1981, section III, p. 1.
22 Steve Pond, "Rock Stars Rally To Help vets," Rolling
Stone, 15 October, 1981, 68.
23 Newsweek, 12 December, 1981.

24 Timothy Noah,
August 1981, 23.

"The Vet Offensive," New Republic, 1
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poems about the war were produced by veterans and
virtually all of the art concerned them.

By the early

eighties the veteran was even a sex symbol in such
successful commercial ventures as the television show
Magnum, P.I."

starring heartthrob Tom Selleck, and the

Missing In Action movies of karate showman Chuck Norris.
The most common portrayal of veterans, said Freedman, was
the "survivor as hero," a man who had fought a senseless war
in Asia and returned home to an ungrateful, sometimes
hostile America.

He was grim but proud, and Freedman quoted

Harvard historian Alan Brinkley in underscoring the appeal
of such a figure for Americans.

Said Brinkley, litHe's

someone who's been through the fire and come out stronger,
someone who's been tested by failure, someone who's been
betrayed--either by his leaders for not being allowed to
fight without restraints or, more moderately, by his country
for being sent at all.
literature.,,,25

That's a theme in a lot of the

John Milius, who co-authored the script for

Apocalypse Now, predicted the Vietnam veteran would become
"the most romanticized war hero in American history. ,,26
Freedman believed the newfound respect for Vietnam
veterans was the one point of consensus Americans had on the

25 Freedman, 51.

26 Ibid., 52.
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war. 27

Max Cleland, an amputee veteran who directed the

Veterans Administration under Jimmy Carter, alluded to the
same general idea when he noted, "Within the soul of each
Vietnam veteran, there is probably something that says,
war, good soldier.' "28

tBad

Americans at large seemed to agree.

A Harris poll conducted for the Veterans Administration in
1979 showed that 62 percent believed the veterans "were made
suckers" and were victims, not perpetrators, of the war.
The war itself was repudiated by better than a three to one
margin. 29
One veteran may have spoken for many of his comrades in
an unsigned letter left at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in
Washington.

Addressed to those in his unit who were killed

in combat, the letter was a mixture of pride, profanity,
confusion and cynical acknowledgement.
A 'Nam vet is in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
and the 101st Airborne built a monument paid for by the
alumni association. On it are names like Lam Son 719,
Bong Ap, Ripcord, Hamburger Hill, Ashau ••
They make dumb movies about the war--one guy wrote
a book about the 13th Valley--Texas Star. • • • At first
it was like some bum trip and never happened. Now they
have parades and shit. Guess time does that • • • •
Can't think of you guys as angels. More like
Valhalla, drinking beer, pissing foam, counting days
'til we go home. Sometimes I sit in the dark and
smoke--I see you in the smoke not like ghosts, but
27 Ibid., 51.
28 Time, "A Homecoming At Last," 22 November 1982, 44.

29 New York Times, 11 November 1979, 30.
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sitting calm--waiting to move out • • • •
People ask if it was worth it? No one really
knows. Would we do it again? Hell yes, don't ask why.
We were the best infantry company in the fucking
world. • . .
I went to this deal with my boss--A guy wrote a
book about Bloods--at the end they asked Viet vets to
stand up--I did--I did for all of us--people
clapped--what the fuck--I think they meant it--wish you
were there--maybe you were.
I feel better writing this-~remember June 6? Why
don't you shitheads ever write?

Personalizing The War
(The Vietnam Veterans Memorial And Other Tributes)

In 1979 a 29-year-old veteran named Jan Scruggs saw The
Deerhunter and could not sleep that night.

He stayed up in

his kitchen with a bottle of whiskey, replaying the war in
his mind.

Scruggs kept thinking that nobody remembered the

names of all the fallen American soldiers.

The next morning

he told his wife he was going to build a memorial to them.
"It'll have the name of everyone killed," he said. 31 Thus
began the creation of the national Vietnam Veterans

30 Edelman, 236-239.

31 Scruggs, 7.
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Memorial.
The non-profit Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund was
established in April 1979 by Scruggs, Washington attorney
and fellow veteran Jack Wheeler and another veteran and
attorney, Bob Doubek.

Relying solely on private

contributions--no government money was used--they set out to
raise funds and found the going slow.

To hasten progress,

Scruggs called on one of his senators, Charles Mathias, Jr.,
a Republican from Maryland, who would lend his support in
crucial ways.

First, he proposed a bill which would

designate a specific site for the memorial.

Second, he met

with Interior Department officials and helped pick the site.
According to legend, Mathias scanned a map of Washington and
put his thumb on a spot he liked.

official.
The official gulped.

"Sure is a good site, Senator."

It was on the Mall, in a place called Constitutional
Gardens, right next to the Lincoln Memorial. 3Z
Mathias's bill was co-sponsored by liberal George
McGovern and conservative Barry Goldwater and later passed
the Senate unanimously.
on June 31, 1980.

President Carter signed it into law

Noting the symbolism of the memorial

32 Ibid., 12-16.
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site, Mathias said, "A location on the Mall is symbolically
appropriate.

We can all recall when the Mall was the

battleground of opinion and dissent regarding the American
role in Vietnam.

Its proximity to the Lincoln memorial is

also fitting, for not since the Civil War had this nation
suffered wounds and divisions as grievous as those endured
over Vietnam. ,,33

Senator John Warner, a Virginia

Republican, assisted in the fundraising, and eventually a
National Sponsoring Committee was formed that included the
likes of First Lady Roslynn Carter, former President Gerald
Ford, retired General William Westmoreland and entertainer
Bob Hope. 34

The idea of a memorial was widely touted.

Turning to the memorial's design, the Memorial Fund
decided to hold an open competition and let a carefully
chosen jury, including prominent sculptures and landscape
architects, select a winner to be approved by the Fine Arts
Commission, the National Capital Planning Commission and the
Secretary of Interior.

The contest's rules were simply that

the winning design must feature the names of American
soldiers killed in Vietnam, Jan Scrugg's original idea; that
it must be horizontal, so as not to clash with the Lincoln
memorial; that it must be landscaped to suit its garden

33 Ibid., 23.
34 Ibid.
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setting; and that it must make no political statement
whatsoever.

The contest drew 1,421 entrees.

It was won, to

everyone's surprise, by a 22-year-old student from Yale
University who was born the year of America's first casualty
Her name was Maya Lin. 35

in Vietnam.

While there had been no controversy over the idea of a
memorial to Vietnam veterans--indeed, little ever passed
Congress so quickly--there was a firestorm over Maya Lin's
design.

It provided for two long walls of black granite,

buried in a glen on the Mall, the walls meeting and sloping
downward, each forming a point on the

ground.

One wall

pointed toward the Washington Monument, the other toward the
Lincoln Memorial.

The names of the 57,692 Americans killed

in Vietnam were to be inscribed on the walls in the order
they fell.

At its center, where the walls would meet, the

memorial would be ten feet high.

The granite would be

finely polished, so visitors could see
reflection. 3S

their own

The strong objections to this unusual design

were summarized by the National Review:
Okay, so we lost the Vietnam War. Okay, the thing
was mismanaged from start to finish. But the American
soldiers who died in Vietnam fought for their country
and for the freedom of others, and they deserve better
than the outrage that has been approved as their
35 Ibid., 49-66.

3S Washington Post, 3 January 1982, section VI, p. 9.
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memorial in the nation's capital • •
Our objection to this Orwellian glop
is based
upon the clear political message of this design.
The
design says that the Vietnam War should be memorialized
in black, not in the white marble of Washington.
The
mode of listing the names makes them individual deaths,
not deaths in a cause: they might as well have been
traffic accidents.
The invisibility of the monument at
ground level symbolizes the tunmentionability' of the
war • . • • Finally, the V-shaped plan of the black
retaining wall immortalizes the anti-war signal, the V
protest made with the fingers • • • . If the current
model has to be built, stick it off in some tidal flat,
and let it memorialize Jane Fonda's contributio~ to
ensuring that our soldiers died in vain . • • •
Secretary of the Interior James Watt was thought to be
displeased with the

~emorial

design, and he had the

authority to delay its construction.

In January 1982, Watt

sent the Memorial Fund a letter saying, in effect, that
construction was on hold until a compromise was reached on
the design.

Watt wanted to add two elements: a statue of

American soldiers and an American flag.

After much

wrangling, the compromise was struck. 3S

Construction

resumed and the memorial was ultimately finished on
schedule and dedicated on Veterans Day in November 1982.
Over 250,000 people descended upon Washington for the
dedication ceremonies.

Some 15,000 marched in a parade

through the capital's streets, grouped by state in
alphabetical order.

Alabama was first, led by General

31 National Review, 18 September 1981, 1064.
38 Scruggs, 85-101.
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Westmoreland himself, who carried two small American
flags.

Veterans of other wars cheered from the roadside.

With many of them wearing blue jeans and old fatigues and
other assorted casuals, the paraders more resembled Coxey's
Army than any official military review.

As the parade

spilled forward, strangers walked up to veterans and shook
their hands, or waved flags and appreciative signs from the
sidewalk.

Herbie Petit, a machinist and Marine veteran from

New Orleans, told a reporter how he and some former Marine
colleagues were cheered in a restaurant by a group of
college students.

"The whole week," he said, "it was worth

it just for that."39
From Wednesday, November 10, to Friday the twelfth,
volunteers at the National Cathedral read the names of the
57,939 Americans known to be killed or missing in Vietnam.
The names were read alphabetically, by candlelight.
volunteer read for half an hour.

Each

President Ronald Reagan

and his wife Nancy attended the name-reading ceremony for 20
minutes, and as he left Reagan told reporters in a choked
voice, "The names that are being read are of men who died
for freedom just as surely as any men who ever fought for
this country . •

We're just beginning to appreciate that

39 Washington Post, 14 November 1982, section I, p. 10.
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they were fighting for a just cause. "40

At the official

dedication ceremony, Jan Scruggs read aloud a letter from
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger which said, "When
your country called, you came.

When your country refused

you honor, you remained silent.
wounds have healed.

With time, our nation's

We have finally come to appreciate your

sacrifices and to pay you your tribute you so richly
deserve.n(l

Most high-ranking military officers did not

attend the dedication ceremonies.

The local Mount Vernon

chapter of the retired officers' association, one of the
largest chapters in the country, could send only six of its
more than 600 members. 42
The generally positive feelings about the memorial's
dedication did not extinguish the debate over its design.
In building his own case against it, writer Tod Lindberg
quoted architect and fellow critic of the memorial William
Hubbard:
The objections to the monument were, in essence,
that it did not glorify the war in ways that other
monuments had--the Iwo Jima Monument being one
frequently cited example. Now clearly a monument
equating Vietnam with World War Two • • • would have been
a sham, a lie. But behind the call for glorification is
the assumption that a momument--any monument--should
make concrete some shared idea about the thing it
40 Ibid., p. 1 •
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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commemorates.
In short, a monument should speak.
that sense, the objections stand4fnaddressed: The
Vietnam monument does not speak.
Lindberg himself said the memorial did speak.

In

Whereas

the Iwo Jima memorial and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
depicted anonymous men, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
depicted individuals, the emphasis being less on the cause
and more on the people.

Lindberg believed this was an

extension of the personal manner in which the war was
reported, noting a belief had grown that to fully understand
war one must see it from the common soldier's perspective,
which was a "truer" one than the more abstract perspective
of generals or politicians.

This was the same idea that lay

behind so much of the war's literature, written for the most
part by common soldiers.

Lindberg pointed to the example of

a well-known article in the New Yorker magazine by Jonathan
Schell, "The Village of Ben Suc," a graphic, personal
account of efforts to rid a riverside village of Viet Congo
Life magazine, with its riveting photography, was another
example.

Lindberg called such an approach the "radical

personalization" of war and said--correctly, if the Vietnam
War literature was an accurate measure--that it had come to

f3 Tod Lindberg, "Of Arms, men And Monuments," Commentary
(October 1984), 51.
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dominate American discussion of war in general. 44
Lindberg further stated that the personal approach was
an apolitical one:
. • • an attempt to sever the soldier from any
connection with his nation's purposes and policies. III
the new understanding, soldiers are no longer agents of
their country but simply individuals caught in extremely
trying circumstances.
If they fight, they fight to stay
alive, or perhaps, at best, to keep their friends alive.
If they kill, they may justly be called murderers • . •
or, perhaps, victims of a higher senselessness.
If they
die, they die for nothing, victims again • • • • without
the context supplied by political understanding, no
moral credit can in fact attach itself to the soldier's
efforts.
• • . one can explain how and why such violence is
necessary, and thereby help to restore the soldier to
his proper status as an agent, sometimes a heroic agent,
of broader political and moral principles.4~Lindberg concluded that the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
said the war was meaningless, senseless.

In his view, it

should have said the war was fought for the defense of
freedom, the containment of Communism and the loyalty of
allies. 46
Essayist Charles Krauthammer had similar criticisms.
After visiting the memorial, he said, "the feeling of waste
and emptiness would not leave me."

He elaborated:

The Vietnam memorial filled me with an overwhelming
feeling of desolation.
I had come prepared for the
funereal black; I had come prepared for the fifty-seven
H Ibid., 52-53.

45 Ibid., 54-55.
46 Ibid., 56.
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thousand names, that inconceivable ocean of suffering.
I had not come prepared to find myself, with them, below
the earth • • • . I had the feeling of being before. a
vast, open grave containing not bodies but names. 41:
Krauthammer clearly received from the memorial a
message of death, which appeared to be what the designer
wished to communicate.

Maya Lin admitted to a fascination

with death, partly a result of reading existential
philosophy.
morbid. "48

She once remarked, "Everyone knows I'm
When living in New Haven as a student at Yale,

one of her favorite retreats was the Grove Street Cemetery,
a place she found peaceful.

Interestingly, she had never

had an experience with death, had not closely known anyone
who died.

"We are supposedly the only creature that

realizes its mortality," she said. "Man reacts to that by
denying its existence.

That's always disturbed me." 49

As for the American dead in Vietnam, "They died: You have to
accept that fact before you can really, truly recognize them
an d rememb er th em.

,,50

Naturally, Krauthammer and other critics found the
memorial not just unglorious but discomforting. Its starting

47 Charles Krauthammer, New Republic, 6 December 1982, 42.
48 Washington Post, 3 January 1982, section VI, p. 9.
49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.
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point for remembering the Vietnam veterans was not a grand
cause or such qualities as sacrifice, bravery, duty, honor.
It was simply death with no meaning supplied, though the
memorial's unimposing and easily overlooked inscription did
pay homage to traditional soldierly virtues: "Our nation
remembers the courage, sacrifice, and devotion to duty of
its Vietnam veterans." 51

Maya Lin had originally wanted no

.
. t '10n wh a t soever. 52
1nscr1p

W.D. Ehrhart put his own objections to the memorial in
verse:
I didn't want a monument
not even one as sober as that
vast black wall of broken lives.

...

What I wanted was a simple recognition
of the limits of our power as a nation
to inflict our will on others.
What I wanted was an understanding
that the world is neither black-and-white
nor ours.
What I wanted
was an end to monuments. 53

51 Scruggs, 80.
52 McConnell, 75.

53 Ehrhart, 103.
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Later, Ehrhart would say about the memorial, "What does
it reveal in terms of the veterans experience?

In my

opinion, I would honestly have to answer, nothing.,,54 Peter
Marin quoted Roland Barthes in expressing his own
skepticism.

"

Barthes had said that cultural myths

• . serve two functions at once: they commemorate the

past but also disguise it, they make it both more and less
th an wh a t

. t was . • • . ,,55

1

Marin's point was identical to

W.D. Ehrhart's, that the Vietnam Veterans Memorial did not
convey the war as

harshly as it was.

Marin recognized that

this would have been impossible: "one can hardly expect
images of napalmed children and weeping parents •

"

Yet, he said, "it would be unfortunate for all of us,
including the veterans, if the memorial had the effect of
closing the door on the past or trying to heal the wounds it
left behind--as
recently,

if, in the words of a veteran I met

(everything was all right now, all hunky-dory,

we're all friends again • • . and the war itself will be
forgotten. ,,56

Marin touched upon two important points in

the postwar debate, or the non-debate, as some would have

54 Lomperis, Reading The Wind, 30.
55 Peter Marin, "What The Vets Can Teach Us," Nation, 27
November, 1982, 54.
56 Ibid., 54.
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said.

First, if the memorial did begin to close the door on

the real past the irony would have been rich, for Jan
Scruggs said repeatedly that the memorial would serve as an
initial step toward remembering the war.

Second, the war

itself, the complex political drama that siezed the nation's
attention as it claimed thousands of American lives, seemed
to have been forgotten well before the memorial was built.
A few suggested that the memorial's ambiguity, or its
lack of stated theme, might leave the door to the past open.
An anonymous poet left this seemingly sympathetic bit of
verse at the wall:
Understand
That if the time comes
When you must kill
It will destroy you
For all of this life.
This is the horrible legacy
of glorifying war
Which no one escapes
Who is the deadliest
Adversary;
The soldier
The truth
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or the monument ?57
Robert Brugger, a former Marine captain, was cautiously
optimistic in a letter to the Washington Post:
Monuments are useful because they help to place
ourselves on the historical landscape and somehow thank
the dead. But they may also hinder our view of what has
gone before. As symbols that simplify, they have the
power to distort as well as to inspire. Perhaps
memorial architect Maya Lin's call to memory will prove
an exception--offering a chastened conception of war,
inviting us to remember the actual tragedy of this war
of doubtful ends and horrendous means. Maybe its
message of muted bravado will sink in, and all of us,
like the men and women matured by the Vierfam
experience, will stand the better for it.
For all the barbs it drew, the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial seemed to have been a critical and popular success.
Within several years it became one of the most visited
attractions in Washington.

One editorial said, "This

austere jumble is extraordinarily personal, it appears.
Some have said they think the memorial is too negative;
perhaps they have spoken before seeing its powerful effect
on

.

. t ors. ,,59

Vl.Sl.

Scenes of visitors crying and veterans

embracing became commonplace, and remarkable was the quickly
established custom of leaving writings and mementoes at the

57 Laura Palmer, ed., Shrapnel In The Heart: Letters And
Remembrances From The Vietnam Veterans Memorial (New York:
Random House, 1987), section I, p. 18.

58 Washington Post, 17 November, 1982, section I, p. 18.

59 New Republic, 6 December 1982, 39.
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wall, making it, in the technological parlance of the
information age, an interactive memorial.

The custom began

when a veteran dropped his purple heart into wet cement as
the memorial's foundation was being built.

At last count,

more than 6,000 offerings had been left, each completely
personal: snapshots, poems, flags of all description, teddy
bears, packs of cigarettes, harmonicas, cans of C-rations,
playing cards, Bibles, a blue high heel.

It was all

collected and preserved in an Interior Department warehouse,
every i tern tagged and dated. 60
A half-sized replica of the memorial was brought to
cities around the country, and in Eugene, Oregon, a woman
named Carole Page left a note at the replica in memory of a
former boyfriend.

Several days later she returned to the

site and found an unsigned note addressed to her:
Dear Carole,
I did come home in the hearts and minds of each of
the living. Every man and woman that came back brought
a part of me.
I have talked to you with their voices
and loved you with their hearts. Don't be scared for I
am always with you.
I will always be there in t~e still
of the night. Be still, you will hear my voice.
In the New Yorker magazine's Talk Of The Town section,
an unnamed writer called the memorial "an excerpt from
reality":
60 Palmer, xvi-xvii.
61 Ibid., 96.
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• • . pure data that haven't been tampered with • • . •
candid and free of emotional clutter. • • • In a way, we
[Americans] wish to believe that our own perceptions are
sufficiently good, clear-eyed and sound, that our
interpretation of the data, not someone else's, is what
matters, and the closer we are to the unmanipulated,
undoctored source the better--the greater the likelihood
that some truth will be obtained. This is democratic.
It's American to distrust incantations and obscurihies,
to want to go straight to the heart of the matter.
Bruce Weigl, a Vietnam veteran and poet, wrote of "the
terrible grace of Maya Lin's wall" and added, "in the cold
wind blowing off the reflecting pool beyond Maya Lin's wall,
you could pick up your head again; you could believe that
you had finally come home."63

Another veteran said upon

visiting the memorial, "Until today, it [leaving the war]
was like walking out in the middle of a movie.
today makes you feel it's over."64

A day like

Conservative columnist

James Kilpatrick believed the memorial would be "the most
moving war memorial ever constructed," offering "none of the
.
b omb ast " seen 1n

0

th ers. 1i5

He said further:

This memorial has a pile driver's impact.
No politics.
No recriminations.
Nothing of vainglory or of glory
either.
For 20 years I have contended that these men
died in a cause as noble as any cause for which a war

62 New Yorker, 18 March 1985, 35-36.
63 Bruce Weigel,
1982, 549.

"Welcome Home," Nation, 27 November,

64 New York Times, 11 November 1984, section I, p. 28.
65 James J. Kilpatrick, Washington Post,
1981, section I, p. 27.

11 November
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was ever waged. Others have contended, and will always
contend, that these dead were uselessly sacrificed in a
no-win war that should never have been waged at all.
Never mind. The memorial carries a ~essage for all
ages: this is what war is all about.
The memorial in Washington was hardly the only tribute
to the Vietnam War and its veterans.
had either been built or planned.

By 1986, 143 memorials

In New Castle, Delaware,

there was a statue of a black soldier carrying a dying white
comrade.

In Kansas City, Missouri, there was a series of

pools arranged in ever-growing size to symbolize the gradual
growth of America's involvement in Vietnam.

In Cushing,

Minnesota, a veteran planted a forest of 25,000 trees in
commemoration.

Some of the memorials, such as the one in

Delaware, spoke of the civil rights movement as well as the
war.

A proposed memorial on the Mississippi River in

Memphis, Tennessee, would show an ethnically mixed squad in
combat.

According to the Project on the Vietnam Generation,

a nonprofit group studying the men and women who came of age
during the war, the memorials were mostly the work of
Americans between the ages of thirty-two and forty-nine. 61
Some tributes were even more personal than the
Washington memorial.

In 1971 Victor Westphall, a retired

66 Ibid., 21 September 1982, section I, p. 19.
61 "Vietnam Memorials Underway Nationwide," ibid., section

I, pp. 8-9.
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building contractor with a Ph.D. in history, finished his
own memorial in the barren hills of Eagle Nest, New Mexico.
The creation was primarily for his son, David, but was for
all others slain in Vietnam as well.

The Vietnam Veterans

Peace and Brotherhood Chapel was two long, low triangles,
side by side, looming over the Moreno Valley as if wings
come to rest.

A small chapel sat between the wings.

Inside

the chapel were photographs of dead soldiers, with popular
music of the war years piped in.
floodlit.

At night the chapel was

Victor Westphall built the memorial largely

with his own hands and money.

He lived alone, in a small

cabin on the hillside beneath his creation. Sa
Ben and Miriam McDermott of Nashville, Tennessee, paid
tribute in a manner that may have been common among the
families of dead soldiers.

The McDermotts converted their

back porch, where their fallen son Ben, Jr., used to sleep,
into a sort of family museum.

It contained Ben, Jr.'s

Marine saber, some of his military emblems mounted and
framed, the flag which draped his coffin, his karate belts,
snapshots of him in Vietnam, a picture of him in his
football jersey.

"We just kind of dedicated the room to

him," said Ben, Sr.

"I don't know if other families do

68 New York Times, 13 November 1982, section I, p. 8.
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this, but sometimes we kind of feel like he's here.,,69
Thus in countless ways the Vietnam War was personalized
in memory.

Jan Scruggs was not alone in insisting that the

names of the dead be remembered.

Among many others of like

mind, Michael Norman, a veteran and a reporter for the New
York Times, said:
I wanted to forget almost everything else, but
never, never the names. They stayed with me--Iong after
the smell of the field and the echo of the guns, long
after that moment when a rainstorm was finally just a
rainstorm and not the assault of a jungle monsoon. My
uniforms lost their fit. My rifleman's eyes took on
glasses. But I always remembered the names.
. • • I came home quickly from the war--no drinks
with the boys down at the Legion Hall, no parades or
veterans' protests in the streets. But I tried, tried
often during the last 16 years, not to forget the
names • . • . Jim Payne of Glendale, California.
Jim
Parsons of Warsaw, Missouri. Tommy Gonzales of
Beeville, Texas.
It was, in part, a matter of duty, one
marine kfieping alive the memory of others--semper
fidelis. 0
Like the literature of the veterans, the nation's
remembrance of the Vietnam experience was personal.

The

monuments and other expressions remembered the men and women
touched by the war, not the cause itself.

69 Palmer, 23.
70 Michael Norman, "For Us The War Is Over," New York
Times, 31 March, 1985, p. 64.

CHAPTER 4
A LESSON IS DRAWN

Various Early Lessons

Because the Vietnam War was for the most part
remembered personally instead of politically, it may have
seemed as though no national lessons were drawn from the
experience.

Referring to the war's portrayal in fiction,

Samuel Freedman asked whether "the totality of individual
artistic responses • • • amounted to a national response."1
The veterans who chronicled their own experiences tended to
be wary of lessons.
"simple event.

Tim O'Brien referred to the war as

. . . A war

like any war.

No new messages. "2

He also wrote, "Can the foot soldier teach anything
important about war, merely for having been there?
not.

He can tell war stories."3

I think

Of his book Rumor Of War,

Phillip Caputo said, "It might, perhaps, prevent the next
generation from being crucified in the next war.

Freedman, 55.
2 O'Brien, Cacciato, 288-289.
3 O'Brien, Combat Zone, 23.
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But I
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don't think so."4
But even though the American public did not truly
debate the Vietnam War after 1975, even though the war's
political history and the Vietnamese were largely forgotten,
numerous lessons were drawn and some applied.

For President

Jimmy Carter, elected the year after the war ended, the
American role in Vietnam offered guiding ideas about foreign
policy.

Carter promised to conduct foreign affairs more

openly and morally, with a stronger commitment to human
rights than to containing Communism at every turn.
adventures were not in favor.

Military

As a presidential candidate,

Carter referred to "the quagmires of Cambodia and Vietnam"
and said, "I would never • . • openly or covertly, legally
or

illegally, support nations who stand for principles on

which their own people violently disagree and which are
completely antithetical to what we believe in."5

In a

televised address in 1979, President Carter cited the war as
a major cause of America's "malaise," saying, "We were
taught that our armies were invincible and and our causes
always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. "6

4 Caputo, xix.
5 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1986), 30.
6 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books,
1982), 120.
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Carter seemed to believe the Vietnam War was a profound
moral mistake, not only a strategic one.

He was reluctant

to intervene militarily overseas, though in 1980, his last
year in office, he unsuccessfully sent forces to free the
hostages in Iran and proclaimed the Carter Doctrine to
defend the Persian Gulf oil lanes.

Critics termed such

reluctance the "Vietnam syndrome," saying Carter and his
like were traumatized by the Vietnam War and indecisive in
conducting foreign policy.

One such critic, Robert Tucker,

said, "So long as the nation's collective memory of Vietnam
is determined by the conventional view of this war [Carter's
contrite view], it will be difficult for us to act with the
pride and assurance we require.

In a word, the

rehabilitation of American foreign policy depends on the
rehabilitation of Vietnam."?
Carter was joined by many others in seeking lessons
from the war.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in

December 1979 there ensued a debate on whether they had
entered their own Vietnam. S

When the Reagan Administration

in 1981 increased military assistance to the government of
El Salvador, which was fighting Communist guerillas, critics
compared the scenario to the early days of American

7 Robert Tucker, "Spoil of Defeat: Rationalizing
Vietnam," Harper's, 11 November, 1981, 87.

8 Time, "Kabul Is Not Saigon," 10 March 1980, 32.
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involvement in Vietnam.

Clarence Long, a Democratic

Congressman from Maryland, said, "This administration is
making the same kinds of mistakes that an administration of
my own party was making 18 years ago."g

In 1982 Congressman

Bill Alexander, an Arkansas Democrat, said, "Most people
don't know where EI Salvador is, but the ghost of Vietnam
hangs over every instance of military support or action in a
foreign country. ,,10

When an American advisor was reported

carrying a rifle in EI Salvador--only pistols were
permitted--the story made headlines across the nation and
President Reagan was forced to bring the man home.

When an

American intelligence ship was reported off the Salvadoran
coast, comparisons were made with the Gulf of Tonkin
incident .11
In 1983, the Vietnam War was invoked as reason to
withdraw troops from Beirut, where they were stationed to
enforce an elusive peace.

Congressman John McCain, an

Arizona Republican and former prisoner of war in Vietnam,
said, "The longer we stay in Lebanon, the harder it will be
for us to leave.

We will be trapped by the case we make for

9 National Review,

"No More Vietnams,"

17 April 1981,

403.
10 New Republic, "The Vietnam Analogy," 17 March 1982, 7.
11 Ibid.
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having our troops there in the first place. "12

Conservative

Democratic Senator John Stennis of Mississippi intoned that
he had supported his leaders for too long during the
Vietnam War and that this time we would not "gO for it."13
The lessons of the war briefly became an issue between
Senator Gary Hart and former Vice President Walter Mondale
during the 1984 Democratic primaries.

Hart said his own

foreign policy views were formed during the war, signifying
a generational divide between himself and the older Mondale,
whose views were formed during World War Two and the early
Cold War.

Hart criticized Mondale for favoring the

continued presence of American advisors in Honduras and for
being late in calling for the withdrawal of the troops in
Beirut.

Mondale responded by saying Hart had learned the

"wrong lesson"

from the Vietnam War, the idea that any

American intervention was foolish.

According to Mondale,

the right lesson was that there were limits to American
power, but that the United States still needed to playa
strong international role. 14
It was common for someone of Hart's generation to cite
the war as the major influence on their foreign policy

12 MacPherson, 609.
13 Ibid.
14 New York Times, 4 April 1984, section VIII, p. 9.
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thinking.

Mike Synar, a Democratic Congressman from

Oklahoma who admitted the war had made him suspicious of
military actions, said, "We learned that anything military
has to have the support of the American people.

I come from

a hawki8h state where you'd think people really would look
at Central America as a place where we draw the line, but I
don't think they're buying the president's rhetoric. fll5
Another young congressman, Republican Newt Gingrich of
Georgia, said, "Our generation is much more fascinated with
foreign policy than our elders were.

From my bias, I feel

that many members of Congress on the left were 'vaccinated'
by Vietnam.

The driving moral argument for antiwar

Democrats is still Vietnam.

• .

,,16

The Weinberger Doctrine

In a campaign speech before the Veterans of Foreign
Wars in August 1980, Ronald Reagan said of the Vietnam War,

"

..

• it's time we recognized that ours, in truth, was a

noble cause.

We dishonored the memory of 50,000 young

15 Washington Post, 15 April 1985, section I, p. 18.
16 Ibid.
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Americans who died in that cause when we gave way to
feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful.,,17
To reporter Elizabeth Drew in a private interview, Reagan,
in reference to his opponent Jimmy Carter's description of
the war as "moral poverty," said, "When fifty thousand
people, young Americans, give their lives to protect the
people of a small country, a defenseless country, against
godless Communist tyranny, I think it is an act of
collective courage, not moral poverty. ,,18
Reagan's remarks were treated in the media as gaffes,
for no serious candidate for national office since 1975 had
uttered such sentiments, but Reagan did not apologize for
them.

To the contrary, he held fast to his belief in the

Vietnam War's justness.

In 1985 Reagan was asked for his

thoughts on the tenth anniversary of the war's end and he
the truth of the matter is that we did have

said, ".
victory.

We continue to talk about losing that war.

didn't lose that war.
engagement.

We

We won virtually every major

. When the North Vietnamese did violate the

treaty and the then-administration asked Congress for an
appropriation to keep our word, Congress refused. ,,19

17 New York Times, 19 August 1980, section I, p. 1.
18 Elizabeth Drew, Portrait Of An Election (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981), 175.
19 New York Times, 19 April 1985, section I, p. 9.
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Judging from the election results, Reagan's remarks
during the 1980 campaign did not greatly offend the public.
Indeed, his subject was not whether to fight such a war
again but whether Americans should feel ashamed of their
role, or their motives, in Vietnam.

Coming in the midst of

the Iranian hostage ordeal and the surge of nationalism it
generated, Reagan's moral defense of the war may have
actually helped his cause.
not a strategic one.

But it was a moral defense only,

It was, in general, of the same

variety as Norman Podhoretz's and Richard Nixon's arguments.
When Elizabeth Drew asked Reagan about the strategic wisdom
of fighting the Vietnam War, Reagan replied, "I was one who
never believed we should have gone in.

I've always believed

in the [General Douglas] MacArthur dictum that you don't get
involved in a land war in Asia.

But the troops were sent

in; once we sent them in, then you have made a commitment to
the men you're asking to fight that you are going to give
them every resource to win this thing and get them home as
soon as

POSSl. bl e.

,,20

This post-war assessment of military interventions,
emphasizing the need to strike forcefully and win quickly
rather than allowing events to be prolonged, was put into
policy by Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger,

20 Drew, 118.
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in November 1984.

The so-called Weinberger Doctrine set

conditions for deploying troops abroad: the public must
clearly understand and support the action, so the nation
could muster the will for a decisive victory.

Said

Weinberger, "Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad,
there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the
support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress.

We cannot fight a battle with

the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war
overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our
troops not to win but just to be there."B

Weinberger later

elaborated on his doctrine, noting, "There's still a very
strong feeling against any kind of United States involvement
in actions that require military force.
legacies [of the Vietnam War].

That's one of the

To my mind the principal

lesson learned is that we should never go into combat if
it isn't important enough to our national interests.,,22
In a speech eleven days after Weinberger's
pronouncement, Secretary of State George Schultz replied to
it skeptically, saying, "There is no such thing as
guaranteed public support in advance.,,23

President Reagan

21 David Fromkin and James Chase, "What Are the Lessons
of Vietnam?", Foreign Affairs.
(Spring 1985), 730.

22 Willenson, 393.
23 Fromkin and Chase, 730.
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did not publicly comment on the policy, but his actions
seemed to endorse it.

During eight years in office his only

deployments of American troops were of a relatively small
scale, sending several hundred Marines to Beirut and then
invading the tiny island of Grenada, both in 1983.

Reagan

also retaliated against various Middle Eastern terrorists
with swift, surgical strikes.

When the Beirut adventure

soured, over 200 Marines being killed by a suicide car bomb,
Reagan quickly withdrew the remaining forces.

In Grenada,

the odds for success were great and the victory accomplished
in a matter of weeks.

To contain Communism on a larger

scale, Reagan relied on foreign soldiers, supplying
substantial anti-Communist movements in Nicaragua and
Afghanistan.

Americans did not playa combat role in

either war.
This strategy had roots in the Nixon Doctrine of 1969,
which was tied to Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, or
turning the fighting back over to the South Vietnamese while
gradually withdrawing American forces.

In his book No More

Vietnams, Nixon wrote, "I realized that after our experience
in Vietnam the American people would be very reluctant to
commit American forces to another war in the Third World
. . • . We should provide military and economic aid to the
target countries equal to that provided to the insurgents by
the Soviet bloc, but the country under attack should have
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the responsibility for providing the men for its defense
.

. We should never again make the mistake we made in

Vietnam. "24

Caspar Weinberger apparently felt the same way.

Richard Holbrooke, a former executive aide to Ambassadors to
South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and Maxwell Taylor, noted
that Weinberger's insistence on political support and fast,
effective force "come precisely out of his understanding of
Vietnam.

He wouldn't have thought of those two things

twenty or thirty years ago.

Now they carry great weight and

he raises them to argue for limits on involvement."Z5
Journalist Robert Wright commented on the Weinberger
Doctrine cynically: "Reagan, we are told, showed in Grenada
and Libya [in response to alleged terrorism] that he was
willing to see tens of Americans die for American ideals,
and he showed in Afghanistan and Nicaragua that he was
willing to pay tens of thousands of foreigners to die for
them. "26

Writing in Harper's, Jonathan Schell struck a

similar note:
To be sure, whenever apparent toughness could be
demonstrated without paying a high cost--as it could,
for example, in the invasion of Grenada, or in the
bombing of Libya in response to terrorist attacks
allegedly planned in or supported by Libya--the
administration acted, and the public applauded. But

24 Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House,
1985), 217-218.
25 Willenson, 398.
26 Robert Wright, New Republic, 9 January 1989, 6.
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when intervention clearly had a high cost attached
• the administration held back, and the public made
no complaint. The line that the public did not wish to
cross was clearly, if not nobly, drawn: the expenditure
of the lives of people from other countries was
acceptable; the expenditure of American lives was
not . • .
Strangely, after ten years of fighting in Vietnam
and political turmoil at home, the war remained
undigested in public opinion. The public was left in a
state of unresolved ambivalence--repelled by the
tangible prospect of any more Vietnams yet still
attracted to the policies that led the United States
into Vietnam.
[1972 presidential candidate George]
McGovern's political mistake had been to begin to
articulate a picture of the world that reflected only
one side of the public's ambivalence. President Carter,
straying further down this path, won a McGovern-like
reputation for weakness • • • . Reagan was politically
wiser. He followed to the letter the public preferences
revealed in the latter days of the Vietnam War: he gave
the public McGovernite decisions accompanied by Nixonian
talk, and the public returned him to office in a
landslide. 27
Both Wright and Schell noted the importance of sparing
American lives in pursuing a post-Vietnam foreign policy.
While a majority of the voters may have supported Ronald
Reagan's assertive policies, few were willing to have
American troops used in large numbers, a reluctance that did
not escape the attention of Caspar Weinberger.

According to

him, America should avoid conflicts like the one in Vietnam
unless they were truly important to the national interest.
In forgetting or never even learning the Vietnam War's
political history, Americans silently commented on how

27 Jonathan Schell, "Talk Loudly And Carry A Small Stick, "
Harper's (March 1989), 46-47.
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important Vietnam was to them.

They remembered instead the

war's effects on their countrymen, a personal rather than a
political memory.

But on a national scale, personal

remembrance made a political imprint.

The emphasis on what

the war had done to individual Americans was a restraint on
policymakers in Washington.

CONCLUSIONS

In the American mind from 1975 to 1985, the Vietnam War
was half a memory.

The war's effects on Americans, their

nation's foreign policies and prestige were remembered, its
political history and the nation of Vietnam were not.

The

war's tangible purpose of preserving an independent,
non-Communist South Vietnam was quickly forgotten, though
the abstract purpose of containing Communism was remembered
and preserved, witness the policies of Ronald Reagan, who
modified containment to avoid any high cost in American
lives.

While it would seem as though containment in general

had been important, Vietnam in particular was not truly so.
Thus, the loss of Vietnam was easily forgotten, as was the
political history of American efforts to prevent it.
Americans wanted to forget the war because it was an
unpleasant, complicated affair.

They were able to forget

because not only did the distant war fail to touch most of
them indelibly, many seemed to consider its goal
unessential.

A small nation--on the other side of the

world, with no ties of culture, language or geography to the
United States--was lost to Communism and Americans got on
with their lives.

Their concerns tended to be immediate and
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personal.
It is the conclusion of this study that Americans
remembered the Vietnam War as well as could be expected, or
perhaps even better.

Since Vietnam was not dear to the

hearts of most Americans, naturally the history of America's
involvement there was forgotten or never even learned by
most.

In fact, it was probably no more forgotten than were

earlier wars fought for reasons other than national
survival, for example, the Korean War.

Indeed, since the

Vietnam War was controversial and lost, certain of its
aspects may have been remembered with unusual clarity,
humanitarian ones, especially.

The war was remembered in a

strongly humanitarian way because the few who
remembered--most of them Vietnam veterans, the bulk of the
minority touched by the war--did so personally, avoiding
political abstractions.

In most of the veterans' written

accounts neither the Vietnamese nor the war's political
history was forgotten, but these writings tended to look
inward.

Alienated from politics and global strategy, the

authors told their own stories with an emphasis on
concrete detail.

They were intent on showing the war as it

really was, for themselves, anyway.

Such personalized

history was not new, having had roots in previous modern
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wars, the First World War most prominently, but it struck a
chord after the Vietnam War because the war's political
history was not much recounted and so there was a void to
fill.

Mainly, the personal approach was honest

self-reflection, not xenophobic self-absorption.
however, set a pattern for remembering the war.

It did,
Americans

looked in the mirror, not across the Pacific and into the
rice paddies.
When the American public finally remembered the Vietnam
experience at the end of the 1970s, prodded by veterans
demanding recognition, the focus was on the warrior, not the
war.

Again, the fate of Vietnam was not foremost in the

national memory.

Again, political history was shunned.

Personal remembrance took its place, most notably in the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, a sort of expense
statement of American lives.

It is probably true that a

political memorial could not have been built, for agreement
on its message could not have been reached, but more telling
is that an apolitical memorial was in fact built.

In other

words, the nation was able to remember the war with an
official expression that avoided politics.

A Vietnam War

memorial was never built; a memorial to veterans was.
Surely this indicates how little Americans truly cared about
the tangible political purpose of the war--preserving South
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Vietnam.

On this point semantics are important.

Americans

cared about the Vietnam War because it was a battlegound in
the larger effort to contain Communism; it was a test of
American will and prestige and it claimed so many American
lives.

But Americans did not seem to care so much about the

nation of Vietnam, the human reality versus the political
abstraction.
Ironically, perhaps, the abstraction of containment was
not forgotten or abandoned after 1975, but rather modified
to lower the cost in American lives.

Richard Nixon began

this modification in 1969 with his Nixon Doctrine and it
reached full flower under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, as
evidenced by the Weinberger Doctrine.

American lives

would not be expended in great numbers for anything less
than a vital cause, one which enjoyed full public support.
As Caspar Weinberger noted, after 1975 Americans were loathe
to commit troops overseas, an acknowledgement on his part
that the manner in which the war was remembered had much to
do with official policy.

Personal remembrance, its

attention to individual lives and sufferings, acted to
restrain policymakers from foreign adventures.
This particular legacy of personal remembrance would
seem to refute the criticisms of people like W.D. Ehrhart,
who found the Vietnam Veterans Memorial too vague and
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ambivalent, not a strong enough warning about war, and Tim
O'Brien, who wrote, "Fuzzily, we recall the outlines of and
the bare silhouettes of the issues, but we do not, I fear,
recall much of the detail.

• The national memory, like

the memory of soldiers, is too damn short."l

As reflected

in the Weinberger Doctrine, memory had a concrete effect.
It is important as well in answering the conservative case
that the memorial, and the war's "radical personalization"
in general, was inappropriate.

The opposite of radical

personalization would be radical "abtracting," a description
some might apply to the thinking which led America into
Vietnam in the first place.

In remembering the Vietnam War,

Americans did not abandon containment in the abstract, but
they were unwilling to secure it with American blood, for it
was not the abstraction which made the war such a grim
memory, it was the reality of over 57,000 American deaths.
Jimmy Carter was wary of containment and did not pursue it
forcefully for most of his term, but Ronald Reagan was
determined to resuscitate it.

In doing so, he was forced by

the public's memory of the war to be imaginative, to choose
his battles wisely and keep the costs low.

There is a case

to be made that Reagan succeeded, playing the role of
post-Vietnam Commander in Chief skillfully, with prudence.

I Horne, 206.
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Certain of Reagan's fellow conservatives, Norman Podhoretz
most notably, did not seem to share his realism and
political instincts.

Even after the war they continued

their radical abstracting by saying that although the war
was strategically unsound, it was a moral and noble
undertaking and thus a good idea.

To them, it seems, the

thousands of names on Maya Lin's wall were the true
abstraction, while notions of containment and dominoes were
as real as flesh.
Both the political right and left remembered the war in
moral terms.

The left's moral argument was expressed by,

among others, a writer and Vietnam veteran named Daniel
Swain, who was scathing in his words:
I know, I know, I'm being insensitive to those poor
Vietnam vets who have to live with the terrible guilt of
what they did.
I've read the stories about the poor SOB
who can't look at his darling children without wanting
to break into tears because he blew away a little
Vietnamese child about the same age so many years ago.
Perhaps part of the reason I .don't sympathize is that I
am one of those vets. But the fact is, isn't that what
we should feel, mind-torturing guilt for the rest of our
lives? Can't anyone see that we deserve to feel guilty?
Doesn't anyone see that the entire ball of
rationalization that we built for ourselves--we were
only nineteen, we thought we were fighting a war of
liberation, we believed in our country--is just so much
bullshit? Nineteen or not, we made a choice that
revealed to us our basic inhumanity, and even if we
never willingly killed little kids, in the final
analysis we participated in an enormously immoral act,
and the guilt we feel is a reasonable response to our
acts. We should be forgiven, but we shouldn't expect
to hear 'that's okay,' because the fact is it wasn't and
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never should be

t

okay. ' ,, 2

In the New York Times, Adam Clymer wrote, "We seem to
be inclined to forgive ourselves for having gone there,
inclined also to say if things didn't work out, it wasn't
our fault.,,3

Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense for

Lyndon Johnson, said as much in a 1981 interview:
"Countries, like human beings, make mistakes.
honest mistake.

I feel no sense of shame.

country feel any sense of shame.
what was necessary.

We made an

Nor should the

We felt that we were doing

It proved to be unsound."t

As Saigon

was falling in April 1975, Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger sent a message to members of the American armed
forces, saying, " • . • our involvement.

was intended to

assist a small nation to preserve its independence in the
face of external attack and to provide at least a resaonable
c h ance

0

f

.
1 ,,5
surV1va.

Norman Podhoretz put the conservative moral argument
thus: "Why did the United States undertake these burdens and

2 Daniel Swain, "Brothers In Arms: The Death Of An
Antiwar Veteran," Unwinding The War, Reese Williams, ed.
(Seattle: Real Comet Press, 1987), 108.

a Clymer, 42.
4 Timothy J. Lomperis, The War Nobody Won (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 20-21.
5 Emerson, 36.
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make these sacrifices of blood and treasure and domestic
tranquility?

What was in it for the United States?

It was

a question that plagued the antiwar movement from beginning
to end because the answer was hard to find."6

He added,

"Imprudent though it might have been to try to save South
Vietnam from Communism, it was also an attempt born of
noble impulses.

The same cannot be said of what the United

States did in abandoning South Vietnam to Communism in
1972."1

Very generally, the left and the right said the same
thing: America had treated Vietnam shabbily, immorally.
According to the left, America had entered Vietnam
arrogantly, deluded by notions of global mission and
ignorant of the people she was supposedly trying to save.
In the course of trying, unspeakable damage was done.
According to the right, America had made a solemn vow to
save South Vietnam and then abandoned her in her hour of
need.

Both versions implied that mighty, western America

was unkind to her frail Asian ally.
Whether the Vietnam War should have been remembered as
a moral failure is a question for other studies to answer.
Relevant to this study is that while most Americans seemed

6 Podhoretz, 196.
Ibid., 172.
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to have had some moral qualms about the war--a survey in
1982 showed that 72 percent felt the war was "more than a
mistake" and was "fundamentally wrong and immoral"S--a
national debate on the episode's morality never took place
after 1975.

At a roundtable discussion of the war in 1985,

Peter Marin said the war as a "moral event" had been lost in
memory.

"That's an immense waste," said Marin.

perhaps have become a wiser people.

"We could

But the war is an

experience that is not becoming part of the collective
wisdom."

To which conservative economist George Gilder

pointedly replied, "Americans are getting on with their
lives, in other words. ,,9
Both Marin and Gilder were half right.

Marin was right

in noting how the morality of America's relationship with
Vietnam was not much remembered.

If America had mistreated

her ally, the public memory of the war did not clearly
reflect it, just as it did not reflect the war's political
history.

Gilder was right in implying that after 1975

Americans avoided recriminations, ideological battles and
self-flagellation, though some believed the latter
flourished, witness Ronald Reagan's stinging response to
Jimmy Carter's description of the war as "moral poverty."

8 MacPherson, 27.
9 Harper's, (April 1985), 44.
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However, Marin failed to mention that in remembering the war
personally, in focusing so intently on what it did to
individuals, Americans showed a moral side, one which duly
considered the horrors of war.

For his part, Gilder failed

to mention that in "getting on with their lives" Americans
forgot about their lost ally, an amoral reaction at best.
The American memory was for the American experience, not for
that of the Vietnamese.
This amorality would seem to have been the least
defensible part of the war's memory.

Again, it is the

conclusion of this study that Americans remembered the war
reasonably well.

Despite forgetting its history and the

people it was fought to save from Communism, Americans did
remember the war's costs vividly enough to inhibit national
leaders from launching similar adventures.

Realistically,

perhaps reflecting upon what the war had done to their own
kind was a sufficiently moral beginning for Americans to
make.

If it was an act of self-absorption, it probably said

more about human nature in general than about the American
character in particular.

Judgment on this, it seems, would

depend on one's moral expectations.
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